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An Update on the Ukraine and Russia War

Trump’s Election Impacts the War

As the conflict approaches the three-year mark, little change is evident in the territory held by Russia since late 2022.  In March of 2022 Russia was close to invading Kyiv. Through that spring and summer Ukrainian forces pushed back the attackers, retaking Kherson and Kharkiv. Since then, Russian forces have moved into the center from Mariupol northwest to almost Pokrovsk.  These lines have been relatively stagnant, with some intense fighting and bombardment and slow Russian advances in the center.  The slight back and forth of the lines belies the intensity and cost of the operations.  Russia, with superior numbers but low morale and supply lines at risk, has eked out small amounts of territory at the cost of many lives.  Overall Russia is thought to have suffered over 500,000 casualties in the conflict.  This month, Ukraine reported its troops had engaged in combat with North Korean troops in the Kursk region of Russia.  The arrival of North Korean troops was cited by US officials as a reason President Biden gave approval for Ukraine to use long-range ATACMS missiles to strike inside Russia.

Each side has pieces transpiring that could form a basis for negotiation toward peace or at least a stable ceasefire.  Ukraine’s hold on land in Russia’s Kursk region combined with the recent ATACMS decision is bolstered by Ukrainian innovation in unmanned systems, providing crucial successes on the battlefield.  Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces have emerged as an independent branch within the Armed Forces of Ukraine, integrating over 170 different types of unmanned systems and new doctrines for their use against Russia.[1]

Putin has been vocal yet non-specific on his intention to use nuclear arms if necessary.  Twenty-eight times in 2022 and 2023, Putin and his leadership mentioned or hinted at the use of nuclear weapons.  One concerning statement was in September 2022 when Putin announced the formal annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, and hinted Russia could use nuclear weapons to defend the territories.[2] More recently, two months ago Putin discussed changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine. It appears Putin’s thinking on nuclear issues may indicate a belief there exists a rationale or “basis for a nuclear war” in response to Western support for Ukraine “when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy”.[3]  Russia has long tried to have it both ways:  Invade when it is in their interest and threaten the use of nuclear weapons to keep others from pushing them back.  Given the lack of any comprehensive world condemnation of these threats, and mixed results of economic and financial sanctions, Russia appears to judge they can continue intimidate while avoiding any substantive consequences.  Russia’s new but unpublished strategy reportedly says aggression against Russia by a non-nuclear-weapon state, but with the support of a nuclear-capable state, should be considered a joint attack on the Russian Federation. This change seems clearly targeted at NATO nations arming Ukraine in the ongoing war.

Putin has reportedly discussed the conflict in general terms with President-elect Trump. During their discussion, Trump pushed the Russian president not to escalate the war in Ukraine. Trump expressed an interest in follow-up conversations to discuss “the resolution of Ukraine’s war soon.”  Reportedly, Trump has signaled he would support a deal where Russia kept some captured territory, but those reports are not confirmed by public statements.

Conclusion

Both sides are attempting to gain positions of advantage that could be bargaining chips in some sort of compromise to end the conflict.  Putin may be concerned that Trump, if provoked, could continue Biden’s support to Ukraine (the ATACMs decision) and has made the use of nuclear arms a discussion topic for the past two years.  Ukraine, using innovation in unmanned systems and the capture of territory inside Russia, along with potential deep strikes, is signaling they will not relent and will continue as long as it takes to expel the invasion.  Trump, the great dealmaker, has publicly said that had the two sides stopped the fighting years ago they would both be in better shape now.  During a campaign stop in North Carolina in September he said: “Any deal — the worst deal — would’ve been better than what we have now,” Trump said. “If they made a bad deal, it would’ve been much better (than what they have now).”[4]

Trump will want a deal to stop the fighting, and the two competitors may believe they might not be able to resist pressure to compromise once he is in office.  Russia will want some territorial compensations in the east, including keeping Crimea (taken in 2014).  Ukraine will have difficulty accepting substantive territorial loss but might be willing to seek a situation where the west makes security guarantees against any future Russian attacks.  Russia will want a promise Ukraine will not become part of NATO, but that could take the form of a future limit of 10 or more years on any Ukrainian entry.  Ukraine may ask for investment as compensation to help rebuild their nation, funded in part by Russian energy exports if a deal can be reached.  Given the other priorities Trump has laid out, this might not be concluded in the first 24 hours but until a settlement is achieved, it will prove to be a distraction to his domestic agenda.

About Michael Snodgrass

Michael Snodgrass retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Major General in 2011. He is currently the President of SG Strategic Solutions LLC.

He has extensive command and leadership experience in the U.S. Air Force and joint world, as well as a wide range of disciplines, including defense and aerospace, technology development, government acquisitions and requirements, foreign military sales and leadership coaching.

He consults with the government, defense industry and other businesses on a wide range of topics. In 2019 he became an adjunct contract professor supporting the U.S. Air Force on strategy and policy development.

From 2014 to 2016 he was Vice President, International Business Development at Raytheon Corp. Prior to that he was Director of U.S. Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration programs at Engility Corp.

General Snodgrass joined Burdeshaw and Associates in 2012 and is a Senior Consultant for numerous clients in the defense and aerospace sectors. Prior to his retirement, he was U.S. Air Force Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs; responsible for formulating and executing USAF Policy, Strategy and Programs for Building Partnerships and integrating Air Force policy with international partner goals, totaling over $40 billion total program value.

From 2007 to 2010 he served as the first Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command. There, he was responsible for the construction of the country’s newest Unified Geographic Command.

He has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels and has lived in/visited over 50 nations while in uniform. He has over 3500 flight hours in various aircraft including the F-16, F-15, F-4, C-130 and HH-60, as well as over 100 combat missions in Operation Desert Storm.

In addition, General Snodgrass teaches leadership and management courses. In his spare time, he provides leadership coaching and training to the U.S. Air Force ROTC unit at Florida State University.

[1] See:  https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-ukraine-establishing-unmanned-forces

[2] See:  https://nuclearrussiaukraine.csis.org/#about

[3] See:  https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-russia-changing-its-nuclear-doctrine-now

[4] See:  https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-live-trump-talks-about-protecting-workers-in-north-carolina-campaign-stop