Executive Summary

• China’s General Zhang Youxia was placed under investigation and removed.
• This caps a multi-year campaign by President Xi Jinping to clear the bench of military leaders.
• President Xi holds multiple positions of power in the party and the government, but has multiple problems to solve in the next 18 months.
• In Iran, years of pervasive economic hardship, and the collapse of Iran’s rial currency, sparked massive anti-government protests in December. The back and forth of threats and promises of diplomacy continue with the US.

Background

On January 24, 2026, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense released a statement that the most senior military person in China, Gen. Zhang Youxia, who was also vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), was placed under investigation for “serious disciplinary and legal offenses,”. Another general, CMC Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli, also was reported to be under investigation for the same allegations.  Zhang was accused of leaking secrets about China’s nuclear weapons programs to the U.S. and accepting bribes for personnel moves.  Xi is attempting to send a message that it is not personal, but necessary considering Zhang’s collaboration with an enemy.

These not unprecedented moves caught the attention of the world because of the apparent shakeup in how the Chinese Military conducts policy and command of their forces.  However, this is not the first time President Xi has taken severe action against the military and will not likely be the last.  The current purge dates to August 2023 when Li Shangfu, former Chinese Minister of National Defense, was purged after a brief tenure, disappearing in August 2023 and officially removed from his position in October 2023.[1] He was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in June 2024, facing corruption charges regarding military equipment procurement.

Under Mao Zedong, former Chairman of the CCP, “marshals” (today’s generals) were purged not for incompetence, but instead for “insufficient ideological submission.” Peng Dehuai was forced out in 1959, after criticizing the catastrophic Great Leap Forward, and was accused of colluding with the Soviet Union to undermine Mao. In 1964, Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky suggested to Marshal He Long in Moscow that China should remove Mao, as the U.S.S.R. had removed Nikita Khrushchev. He Long, also Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, was purged and soon died. Lin Biao, Mao’s anointed successor, was later accused of plotting a coup with Soviet backing; he died in a mysterious plane crash in 1971.

Under President Xi, purges have intensified. Since taking power in 2012, more than 110 senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers have been removed; the most extensive military cleansing since the Cultural Revolution. Historically framed as anti-corruption, Xi’s campaign has increasingly targeted the highest command, especially at the CMC. Eight top generals were expelled from the Communist Party on graft charges in October 2025, including the country’s number two general, He Weidong. He had served under Xi and alongside Zhang on the Central Military Commission. He would have played an important on-the-ground role, should China decide to take any military action against Taiwan. The October purge included nine senior generals and admirals. These key leaders oversaw the strategy toward Taiwan.

Only Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were spared in the October bloodletting, but were later accused of “seriously (betraying) the trust and expectations of the party central committee and the CMC” and “(fostering) political and corruption problems that undermined the party’s leadership” at the end of January. Zhang, 75, a member of the Party’s powerful Politburo, and the senior of the two vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, has long been regarded as one of Xi’s most trusted allies within the military. However, none of these military leaders should have been surprised at Xi’s moves.

President Xi: The Center of the Universe

After Xi took over in 2012, he moved quickly to strengthen the authority of party organizations, resulting in their intervention in the practical details of policymaking, including matters related to personnel and budgeting. As a result, the State Council, China’s central government, rapidly lost its policy-making authority. Last summer, reports began to emerge that some in the nerve center of the CCP had begun to discuss various negative effects, brought about by the extreme amount of power Xi Jinping has managed to accumulate. The main issue appears to be that party organizations headed by Xi as Chinese President, and Party General Secretary, have become bloated and are overstepping their authority.[2]

For the past few years, while serving as the top uniformed officer of the PLA, Zhang Youxia was an important conduit between Xi and party elders, who still exert significant influence. Zhang was reportedly able to give Xi “constructive” criticism, and was seemingly respected within the military, and by the elders. The 2022 decision to retain Zhang as a Politburo member and CMC Vice Chairman was likely the result of a compromise between Xi and party elders. But recently, Xi has not been pleased with the progress of the PLA under Zhang in building a force that could threaten, and perhaps someday, execute an operation to take Taiwan.

China as a Paper Tiger

Scholars indicate several reasons for the continuing purge. Before being purged in October 2025, He Weidong had highlighted some of the PLA’s false combat capabilities. An earlier investigation exposed severe defects within the Rocket Force, such as missile fuel tanks filled with water and silo lids that would not open.[3] These were not minor technical anomalies, but systemic failures Zhang oversaw for years.  It was Xi’s initiative to create the Rocket Force over 10 years ago, but the military branch has seen four purges of its top leadership since.  Also, some analysts have opined that the removal of Defense Minister Li Shangfu was due to severe counterintelligence vulnerabilities, which could suggest western penetration of the PLA. For Xi, who demands an army capable of “fighting and winning wars,” this was unacceptable.

Xi’s often stated goal is the rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation by 2049 (the 100-year anniversary of the PRC). This goal has been the focus of China’s military expansion in the South China Sea and the years-long buildup of the PLA Navy and Air Force. Rejuvenation includes reunification with Taiwan. Although President Xi wants, and needs, to make the economy more of a focus area as they try to navigate President Trumps tariff agenda, with these moves it is clear China is not giving up on military expansion and improvements even if it means clearing the bench and rebuilding the leadership.

Implications

Scores of analysts continue to speculate on the motivations and possible moves inside China and the CCP. Most seem to shine a light on events that reflect their own bias and hopes for the failure of the CCP and Xi. In most cases, finding ground truth is exceedingly difficult until well after the fact. The impacts of previous moves will take months for the dust to settle. The moves have caused no small amount of political turmoil in the CMC and could reduce the likelihood of a near-term military threat to Taiwan. Long term, a more loyal Chinese military generalship could eventually work to Xi’s advantage. Xi has repeatedly emphasized that unification is “unstoppable” and has vowed to take the island by force if necessary. The recent purge reduces China’s threat toward Taiwan in the short term but possibly could become more credible in the long run. The new high command, more in line with Xi’s vision and intent, will work to correct deficiencies and focus their efforts against Taipei. They will need to build a viable force, competently lead, that can deter Washington from intervening should military action be required for reunification. China’s military modernization will continue, and better leadership of the forces and weapons may eventually result in a more believable capability.

There is time for Xi, who has over 18 months until the next Communist Party Congress, in late 2027. That body will select a new Central Commission and in turn appoint a new CMC, and very possibly re-elect Xi as the head of the party. In the meantime, he will need to rebuild relationships with party elders, focus on economic expansion, hire more loyal and competent military leaders, ensure corrective actions are taken to repair broken military capabilities and prepare to discuss these moves with the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). There are 25 members of the Politburo, but power is centralized in the PSC, which currently has seven members. These are the most senior officials in the CCP whose official role is to conduct policy discussions and decide major issues. The PSC is China’s highest ruling council. The launch of China’s 15th Five-Year plan will be a focus as he prepares for the 21st Party Congress in 2027.

Because Xi will be seeking an unprecedented fourth term as President, the lack of a visible successor to the 72-year-old creates some tension because, given the recent purges in government, officials seeking to move up may be prioritized for their loyalty over technical competence. It will be a busy time.

Iran and the US: Managing Expectations While Making Threats

Years of pervasive economic hardship, and the collapse of Iran’s rial currency, sparked massive anti-government protests in late December 2025. The unrest spread across all of Iran’s 31 provinces. As part of their response, the regime imposed a nationwide internet blackout in a failed attempt to hide the regime’s excessive use of force against protestors.

Reports vary on the government’s sweeping crackdown that killed from 6,400 protestors, to as many as over 30,000 – with only about 3100 deaths reported by the government. President Trump initially threatened military intervention if Iranian protesters were killed, but in a typical reversal, later backed away from immediate strike plans. He subsequently performed a whipsaw-like change in direction, with intensified threats of military action, if Iran refused to negotiate on its nuclear weapons program. As the U.S. continues building military power in the Middle East, U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi are met in Oman to discuss Iran’s nuclear program and “other sources of tension.”

At the same time, as protests quieted, the U.S. turned its attention to the Iranian Nuclear Program. With the buildup in progress, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, warned on February 1, that an attack by the U.S. would spark a greater “regional war” in the Middle East; Khamenei’s comments are the most direct threat he has made so far regarding U.S. escalation. U.S. forces shot down an Iranian drone approaching the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in the Arabian Sea on Tuesday, 48 hours after Khamenei’s threats. While talks are scheduled, the agenda keeps expanding with Secretary of State Marco Rubio saying the Trump administration wants negotiations to focus not only on Iran’s nuclear program, but also “the range of their ballistic missiles,” “their sponsorship of terrorist organizations across the region,” and “the treatment of their own people.”[4] This statement was made after the Iranian drone incident, and days after the Supreme Leader’s threats of a wider regional conflict.

After the back and forth, sources confirmed the plan for talks between the two nations. Iran seeks direct talks with the U.S. without the usual third-party intermediary. The direct format has long been sought by the Trump administration. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed that talks began Friday in the Omani capital of Muscat. It appears Saudi Arabia will not participate in the talks. It is also unclear if representatives from other Arab countries will be present in Muscat as the talks continue. The White House has not confirmed whether the Omanis or any other countries will be participating in the talks themselves as third-party intermediaries, or if they will be direct bilateral talks between the U.S. and Iran.

Before Khamenei’s announcement, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told Iranian President Pezeshkian that Riyadh will not allow its airspace or territory to be used for military actions against Tehran, Saudi state news agency SPA reported last week. Speaking on the phone, the crown prince affirmed his country’s support for any “efforts that would resolve differences through dialogue” to bolster security and stability in the region. Historically, Saudi balances public comments such as these with privately communicated concerns; failing to act against Iran might embolden the regime when they make threats against the U.S. and its regional allies. All in all, de-escalation of the situation by Saudi and the U.S. is likely to continue, as the talks kicked off just days ago.

[1] See: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-29/china-military-purge-why-xi-jinping-is-targeting-his-top-generals

[2] See: https://asia.nikkei.com/editor-s-picks/china-up-close/analysis-debate-on-china-s-power-structure-to-have-far-reaching-effects

[3] See: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-03/news/chinese-military-purge-said-show-corruption-weakness and https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-chinesemilitarys-rotten-core

[4] See: https://www.cnn.com/2026/02/05/middleeast/iran-warning-trump-nbc-interview-intl-hnk

About Michael Snodgrass

Michael Snodgrass retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Major General in 2011. He is currently the President of SG Strategic Solutions LLC.

He has extensive command and leadership experience in the U.S. Air Force and joint world, as well as a wide range of disciplines, including defense and aerospace, technology development, government acquisitions and requirements, foreign military sales and leadership coaching.

He consults with the government, defense industry and other businesses on a wide range of topics. In 2019 he became an adjunct contract professor supporting the U.S. Air Force on strategy and policy development.

From 2014 to 2016 he was Vice President, International Business Development at Raytheon Corp. Prior to that he was Director of U.S. Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration programs at Engility Corp.

General Snodgrass joined Burdeshaw and Associates in 2012 and is a Senior Consultant for numerous clients in the defense and aerospace sectors.

Prior to his retirement, he was U.S. Air Force Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs; responsible for formulating and executing USAF Policy, Strategy and Programs for Building Partnerships and integrating Air Force policy with international partner goals, totaling over $40 billion total program value.

From 2007 to 2010 he served as the first Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command. There, he was responsible for the construction of the country’s newest Unified Geographic Command.

He has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels and has lived in/visited over 50 nations while in uniform. He has over 3500 flight hours in various aircraft including the F-16, F-15, F-4, C-130 and HH-60, as well as over 100 combat missions in Operation Desert Storm.

In addition, General Snodgrass teaches leadership and management courses. In his spare time, he provides leadership coaching and training to the U.S. Air Force ROTC unit at Florida State University.