Executive Summary

• China’s National Security White Paper is a framework and guideline for future Chinese expansion of their influence and resistance to US leadership.
• Maintenance of political security, defined as the Party and its leadership, is their primary objective.
• The paper unifies development and security to ensure both are jointly planned, deployed, and mutually reinforced.
• Combined with intelligence, it is estimated that China has set 2027 as the year for the PLA to be capable of invading Taiwan, this paper sets the stage for future decisions.

China 2025 National Security White Paper

On May 12, China’s State Council Information Office released a white paper titled “National Security in the New Era”.  This fulsome and extensive essay outlines China’s evolving security policy in a world the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) characterizes as “unstable and volatile”.  The paper’s view of national security is a “holistic security” umbrella concept including politics, economy, military, science and technology, and societal norms and expectations under the leadership of the CCP, as first articulated by Xi Jinping in 2014. The paper expands the traditional idea of security to include nontraditional security threats from cyberspace, artificial intelligence, biosecurity, public health, etc. The “people’s security” is the final aim, but gained through Chinese sense of “fulfilment, happiness and security”.  It strongly prioritizes “political security as the fundamental task” which means securing the CCP’s absolute leadership.  “As a major socialist country, China must ensure that the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics do not change color; … it must safeguard national unity and ethnic unity and resolutely oppose any form of separatist activities.”[1]

As with any governmental narrative describing the path for obtaining National Security, the CCP outlines the threat: “Western anti-China forces are doing everything they can to contain, suppress and contain China, implement Westernization and differentiation strategies against China, and carry out infiltration and sabotage activities.”  The preface to the white paper views the world as a challenging and in some cases, deteriorating external security environment. It sees a world typified by multiple contradictions, worsening conditions and strong-arm geopolitics, with major countries undermining stability.  The CCP’s Ways and Means for success, are political security as the “foundation”, economic security as the basis, military science and technology, culture and social security as the guarantee for China to provide this security pledge.  More significantly, the paper states, “The core of political security is regime security and system security. The most fundamental thing is to maintain the leadership and ruling status of the Communist Party of China and maintain the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.” (emphasis added)

China’s national security is obtained by safeguarding national interests, especially core interests. China’s core interests are listed and include state power, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, people’s well-being, and sustainable economic and social development.

China places the maintenance of political security, in other words the Party and its leadership continuity, as their primary objective, and the document pledges to enhance security in other areas as the means to maintain that political security. The CCP holds the inferred right to take actions as necessary including preventing political risks, blocking the “transformation channels of risks” in different fields, avoiding “cross-infection”, and preventing non-political (e.g., social and cultural) risks from spreading into political risks. This will “ensure the long-term rule of the Party and the long-term stability of the country.” This emphasis on preserving Party leadership, ideology and system is repeated in the White paper several times, highlighting that the “key to China’s national security lies in the Party”, and “China … always plans security in other areas from the perspective of maintaining political security”.  These statements clearly point to a linkage between the National Security of China and any response to any real or imagined threat as the CCP deems necessary to ensure their continued control and expansion of their influence.

National Security Paper Goals

The paper lists many goals and aspirations.  First is to prevent anti-China forces from implementing a “Westernization and differentiation strategy” by promoting Western democracy, freedom, human rights, and “universal values”.  The CCP will guard against and “severely crack down” on infiltration and subversion such as “color revolutions”[2] and “street politics” instigated by hostile forces.   The paper warns of infiltration, sabotage, subversion and secessionism by hostile forces and universal values like democracy and the pursuit of human rights as attempts to undermine political security. Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Macao are mentioned as territories currently facing such challenges. The paper states that the Party will continue to implement its strategy for governance in these regions, literally “cracking down” on secessionist activities and infiltration. The inference is that the west, and in particular the United States supported if not instigated these actions and supports similar, unacceptable goals for Taiwan.

Unchanged is the CCPs view on Taiwan.  “We will unswervingly promote the complete reunification of the country…adhere to the one-China principle…implement the overall strategy of the CCP to solve the Taiwan issue and promote the peaceful and integrated development of cross-strait relations”. The paper firmly opposes “Taiwan independence” secession and any “external” or Western, interference.  Moreover, the policy promises to “crack down on Taiwan independence diehards” and deter “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces.   After this clear threat, the paper re-emphasizes their goal of peaceful reunification “with the utmost sincerity” but rejects any limitation on the use of force against Taiwan and reserves the option of taking “all necessary measures” to achieve reunification.  Xi has ordered his military to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027, the same year he will likely seek to be reelected for his fourth term as leader of the party, the military and the government.[3]

Trade

One of China’s red lines is safeguarding its right to open development, by opposing export controls, tariffs, technology and public opinion wars, and “long-arm sanctions”. It also promises to conduct reviews of foreign investments that may affect national security.  The paper points out that as of December 1, 2024, China leveled a preferential tariff of zero for 100% of tariff items originating from the “least developed” countries that have established diplomatic relations with China without listing those nations or what criteria are used to define “least developed”. A clear differentiation if not rebuke of current US tariff policies, the paper also confronts US immigration actions under President Trump with a unilateral entry visa exemption policy for people from 38 countries. The paper declares that China has always approached Sino-US relations with mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.  Despite recent tariff discussions, it avoids recent government-to-government friction and commits to a stable, healthy and sustainable future for Sino-US relations and continued friendship between the Chinese and American people. “In the exchanges between the two major countries of China and the United States, neither side can suppress the other from the so-called “position of strength” or deprive the other side of its legitimate right to development in order to maintain its leading position.”  The CCPs four red lines: Taiwan, democracy and human rights, the belt and road system, and the right to development apparently cannot be challenged.

“China firmly opposes the abuse of export controls, unilateral sanctions and “long-arm jurisdiction”. Some countries have launched tariff wars, trade wars, technology wars and public opinion wars against China in the name of security, which seriously threatens China’s security and development. Recently, the United States has announced the abuse of tariffs on all trading partners including China under various pretexts, which has seriously infringed on the legitimate rights and interests of all countries, seriously violated the rules of the World Trade Organization, seriously damaged the rules-based multilateral trading system, and seriously impacted the stability of the global economic order. The Chinese government strongly condemns and firmly opposes this approach.”

Development

The paper clearly and repeatedly links coordinating development and security as one of the major principles of governance, integrating it into the overall framework of economic and social development.  By unifying development and security, China ensures both are jointly planned, universally deployed, and mutually reinforced.  This somewhat novel approach declares that “high-quality development” cannot be realized without “high-level security” and vice versa. This approach positions economic strength as an integral aspect of national stability, both as an end and as a means. China’s dual strategy of expanding domestic consumption while restricting cross-border data flows, foreign investment, and academic exchanges, is fixed under the umbrella of national security.

Defense

Besides the inference of using military force for unification with Taiwan, there is little about military capabilities.  What is included, however, is important.  Despite their successful testing of their capability to destroy a satellite as they did in 2007[4], the paper declares that China is committed to the “peaceful use of outer space” and “firmly opposes the weaponization of space and the arms race in outer space” and actively participates in the UN outer space security governance.  This view is in clear conflict with US military analysis of the Chinese threat in space and their intentions going forward.

Recently Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman reported China is rapidly building an arsenal of counterspace weapons from ground-based lasers to satellites, all of which pose a “grave threat” to the U.S.  Saltzman said the threat is not only from missiles, but the PLA has fielded multiple ground-based laser weapons that can soon disrupt, degrade, or damage satellite sensors. “By the mid-to-late 2020s, we expect them to deploy systems high enough in power that they can physically damage satellite structures,” he said. Supporting these capabilities are China’s jammers that target space-based communications, radars, and navigation systems.  Saltzman also mentioned China’s kinetic counterspace operations—including satellites that can “dogfight” or physically pull other satellites out of orbit.  One of China’s most aggressive initiatives is building a “kill web” that uses hundreds of satellites to find, track, and target forces on Earth, Saltzman said.  The implication is that it’s no longer enough to only focus on protecting U.S. satellites. The U.S. needs to develop systems that can deny China’s use of its space assets, he said, which is central to the service’s new mission of “space superiority.”[5]

Conclusions

China seeks to present itself as a clear alternative to the US and the West.  By focusing on their more benevolent approach to trade while the Trump Administration applies tariff-fueled coercion coupled with a renewed isolationism; China builds partnerships with their neighbors as the US closes USAID and pulls back from support of developing nations.  China is clearly differentiating themselves from the US and the West with a narrative designed to reassure any in the international community the CCP believes they can sway.  China backs up their rhetoric with action, not unlike a drug dealer who initially gives out free samples to set up clients for future dependence on their product.  One example, the China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting which took place in Xiamen, Fujian Province, China from May 28 to 29.  All Pacific Island Countries (PICs) that don’t recognize Taiwan were in attendance.  In an approach that in the US would be called pandering, China has touched sensitive spots in these small nations that bring them closer and open their borders to Chinese products and cooperation initiatives, primarily the Belt and Road initiative (now in its 12^th year).  From a nuclear free agreement to improved flights in and out of some remote nations, China is gaining influence at a time when the US is purposely pulling away from aiding similar nations.

China’s leadership has a clear strategy.  While the US implements a tariff war, and in line with the linkage between development and security, China has pledged to “speed up bilateral Free Trade Agreement negotiations with the relevant Pacific Islands Forum nations.” FTAs can include relaxing customs and visa restrictions, speeding up China’s economic penetration, and come together with the setting up of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the region. On May 26, the Solomon Islands passed the Special Economic Zones Bill 2024 allowing for the establishment of SEZs within the country.

The National Security White Paper is not just an empty document.  It is a framework and guideline for future Chinese expansion of their influence and resistance to US leadership.  How, or perhaps, if the US decides this is a real threat to US national interests and devises a true strategy will be more evident as US policy unfolds…if it is not too late to have effect.

[1] See:  https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202505/content_7023405.htm.  Translation provided by Google.

[2] The phrase “China color revolutions” generally refers to protests and social movements in China inspired by the color revolutions of other countries, particularly in post-Soviet states, where they were associated with peaceful transitions of power following disputed elections. These movements are characterized by large-scale demonstrations, often involving specific colors as symbols of the movement such as Orange (Ukraine 2004), Yellow (Philippines 1986), Rose (Georgia 2003), Saffron (Myanmar 2007) and Velvet (Armenia 2018) revolutions.

[3] See:  https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-taiwan-pla-s-2027-milestones

[4] See:  https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-03/chinese-satellite-destruction-stirs-debate

[5] See:  https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/04/how-china-expanding-its-anti-satellite-arsenal/404283/ 

About Michael Snodgrass

Michael Snodgrass retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Major General in 2011. He is currently the President of SG Strategic Solutions LLC.

He has extensive command and leadership experience in the U.S. Air Force and joint world, as well as a wide range of disciplines, including defense and aerospace, technology development, government acquisitions and requirements, foreign military sales and leadership coaching.

He consults with the government, defense industry and other businesses on a wide range of topics. In 2019 he became an adjunct contract professor supporting the U.S. Air Force on strategy and policy development.

From 2014 to 2016 he was Vice President, International Business Development at Raytheon Corp. Prior to that he was Director of U.S. Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration programs at Engility Corp.

General Snodgrass joined Burdeshaw and Associates in 2012 and is a Senior Consultant for numerous clients in the defense and aerospace sectors. Prior to his retirement, he was U.S. Air Force Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs; responsible for formulating and executing USAF Policy, Strategy and Programs for Building Partnerships and integrating Air Force policy with international partner goals, totaling over $40 billion total program value.

From 2007 to 2010 he served as the first Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command. There, he was responsible for the construction of the country’s newest Unified Geographic Command.

He has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels and has lived in/visited over 50 nations while in uniform. He has over 3500 flight hours in various aircraft including the F-16, F-15, F-4, C-130 and HH-60, as well as over 100 combat missions in Operation Desert Storm.

In addition, General Snodgrass teaches leadership and management courses. In his spare time, he provides leadership coaching and training to the U.S. Air Force ROTC unit at Florida State University.