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Conflict Widens in the Middle East – Again

Executive Summary

  • Tehran cannot defeat Israel militarily nor have substantive effects alone
  • Reversing previous attack/response strategies, Israel has committed to a multi-front war with a short-term tactical mindset and no observable strategic plan or goals
  • Israel’s next choices are limited if they want to contain the conflict to the current regional players. Israel must view all options at once and determine a strategic objective, instead of reacting to the last provocation.

The situation one year after the Hamas attack

In recent weeks Israel and Iran (and their Axis of Resistance) have stepped up military operations against each other in the region and expanded into other nations, specifically Lebanon.  Although valid concerns have been raised about the potential for a wider regional conflict, these incidents are not likely to develop into a “Third World War”.

Recently, Israel stepped up offensive operations on two fronts:  Gaza and Lebanon.  For Lebanon this is not the first time they have seen IDF in their country.  After WW I, France acquired a mandate over the northern portion of the former Ottoman Empire province of Syria and carved out the region of Lebanon in 1920. Lebanon gained independence in 1943, but subsequently experienced periods of political turmoil, interleaved with prosperity due to its geographic position as a regional center for finance and trade.[1]

Since the Hamas attack, Hezbollah has carried out almost daily attacks of varying intensity against IDF units in northern Israel as well as civilians, calling their operation a “support front” for Hamas. In his recent speech to the United Nations, largely ignored by the media, PM Netanyahu said: “Hezbollah is the quintessential terror organization in the world today.”[2] Hezbollah began striking Israel on October 8th, a day after the Hamas attacks.  Israel responded that same day.[3]  As of 5 October 2024, the following forces have attacked Israel 2,351 times:  Hezbollah (2329); Hamas (15); Al-Quds Brigades (2); Al-Fajar Forces (5).  After months of attacks and responses (Israel has responded over 3050 times), Israel’s new offensive began on September 16 with a well planned and executed attack against Hezbollah using booby-trapped pagers, which exploded simultaneously. The next day, walkie-talkies exploded. The two attacks killed at least thirty-two people and wounded about 3,500. On September 20th Israel assassinated Ibrahim Aql, Hezbollah military operations head and commander of the Radwan Brigade, Hezbollah’s top combat unit. His death came six weeks after Israel assassinated top Hezbollah military leader Fouad Shukr, one of several top combat commanders to have been targeted by Irael since the conflict began last October.[4]

Lebanon’s 1975-90 civil war resulted in an estimated 120,000 fatalities, followed by years of social and political instability. In 1982 Israel’s initial push was planned to be geographically limited against Palestinian militants in the south, but rapidly expanded to include Beirut (over 50 miles to the north) as more opposition was encountered. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) occupied parts of Lebanon during the civil war, but did not completely withdraw until 2000.

In 1988 Hezbollah attacked from Lebanon across Israel’s border, killing eight Israelis and kidnapping two more. The IDF initially tried to win using airstrikes. When this didn’t suppress Hezbollah rocket fire, the IDF sent in ill-prepared ground forces, suffering heavier than expected losses. This surprisingly strong resistance burnished the group’s reputation and, over time, helped Hezbollah become even more entrenched in Lebanon. Eventually, the two sides settled, leading to UN Resolution 1701 which obligated Hezbollah to remain North of the Litani River.

In 1982 and 2006 IDF attacks into Lebanon led to unexpected results. In each case the campaign left a well-armed Hezbollah. Attempts to evict Hezbollah from southern Lebanon have not succeeded, and UN Resolutions have been ineffective. In both cases, the IDF had initial success but then ran into challenges that led to extended conflict.[5]  Since 2006 when Hezbollah fired almost 4,000 rockets into Israel in a 34-day period, the terrorist group has expanded its inventory to include 12 different types of land attack rockets, 6 anti-tank weapons systems, 2 anti-ship and 8 anti-air weapons.  Supplied by Iran, Hezbollah has approximately 150,000 rockets, drones/UAVs and missiles stored underground and deployed against Israel with ranges from 40 km to well over 250km…able to reach most Israeli cities and infrastructure.[6]

Clearly the current operation was designed to first eliminate as much of the Hezbollah leadership as possible prior to launching ground operations.    Lessons learned from the previous incursions into Lebanon guided Israeli decisions and timing.  On Monday September 30th, The Jerusalem Post  reported that an invasion of Lebanon could start as soon as approved by the security cabinet. The cabinet, which met at 7:30 p.m., was given multiple choices for courses of action. In the selected option, Israel warned residents to evacuate and move north of the Awwali River.  The river is approximately 80km north of the border and 4-8km north of the Sidon/Jezzine road.

Senior IDF sources expressed surprise at Hezbollah’s ineffective response to IDF attacks since Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination on September 27th.

The clock toward an IDF ground invasion of southern Lebanon moved ahead faster than expected as signs of Hezbollah’s weakness grew. One primary objective appears to be to remove any infrastructure that Hezbollah’s Radwan special forces could use to invade Israel and threaten northern border towns.[7]  Israel wanted to accomplish several objectives instead of waiting for another major attack by Hezbollah.  First among those was to stop the constant attacks by interdicting both the fighters and their virtually inexhaustible supply of weapons.  Second, to eliminate leadership that could organize a counterattack.  Third the IDF appeared to want to send a measure of fear and confusion to the rank and file with the boobytrapped pagers and radios.  However, as in Gaza, collateral damage is significant.  Lebanon’s Health Ministry said that more than 2,000 people have been killed, including 127 children and 261 women.  The killing of Nasrallah and over a dozen senior commanders last month will have significant, but short-term implications for Hezbollah as they will likely partner with Iran to once again overwhelm air defenses and attack Israel.

Iran’s recent attacks and next moves

On Tuesday October 1st, Iran again attacked Israel.  The IDF said more than 180 missiles, (Iranian state media reports said that about 200 missiles) were launched.  The US said the attack was “nearly twice the scope” of what happened in April.  Sirens sounded as Israel’s entire 10 million population was told to head to bomb shelters at about 7:30 local time.  The attack included faster and more lethal missiles.  Unlike the April attack which included slower UAVs and missiles, this attack appeared designed to overwhelm IDF defenses.  As seen in several videos, many missiles were intercepted but also a significant number were not.  It appears that both US and IDF interceptor forces prioritized missiles headed for large populations or infrastructure targets while missiles that were not a threat were allowed to hit the ground without any significant damage.

The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) said in a statement that the missile barrage was retaliation for what it called the “violation of Iran’s sovereignty and the martyrdom” of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, killed by an explosion in Tehran in July that Iranian officials blamed on Israel, but Israeli officials did not claim. They described the barrage as “in line with the legitimate right of (Iran) to defend itself”. It also said the attack was in response to the Israeli air strike in the southern suburbs of Beirut October 4th that killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Brig-Gen Abbas Nilforoushan, operations commander of the IRGC’s overseas Quds Force. A senior Iranian official told Reuters that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei personally gave the order for Tuesday’s missile attack.[8]  IRGC reported Iran used a combination of missiles to achieve different effects. Liquid-fueled Emad missiles were meant to engage Israeli interceptors, while more advanced Fattah and Kheybar Shekan missiles were meant to strike precision targets.  Also, an adviser to IRGC Commander Major General Jabari, claimed on October 2 that Iran conducted a cyber-attack against Israeli air defense systems at the same as its ballistic missile attack on October 1.[9]

Next Steps

Israel will respond, probably soon.  Netanyahu told his cabinet 1 October that Iran’s missile attack “failed” and was “thwarted thanks to Israel’s air defence array”.  “Iran made a big mistake tonight and it will pay for it,” he added. “…Iran does not understand our determination to defend ourselves and … to retaliate against our enemies.”  Defence Minister Gallant was also clear: “Iran has not learned a simple lesson – those who attack Israel pay a heavy price” despite warnings to Iran prior to the latest attack that they would respond.  That said, the US and France have both made statements against escalation, with France calling for a cease fire and an arms embargo against Israel.[10]

However, the Israeli response will likely not be a ground invasion but an air attack against Iranian infrastructure and possibly leadership targets.  In such at attack, overflight of Iraq or Turkey would be necessary to strike Iran.  Sources say the Iraq government will keep clear of military action against either side. Iraqi Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani has held dozens of meetings with political leaders, commanders of armed factions allied with Iran and leaders of Iraq’s security services.  According to one adviser, the prime minister sought to “explain the reality of the situation facing Iraq and the consequences of any Iraqi party getting involved in the ongoing conflict”. He also met with various Arab and western diplomats, and spoke to several regional leaders, including the Egyptian President, Qatar’s emir and the King of Jordan.[11]  These statements, however, are somewhat of a green light to Israel if they decide to launch attacks across Iraqi airspace against Iran.

Israel now has three war fronts and must review each with respect for the others to develop a strategy to navigate through this situation. Previously, Israeli strategy was to punish aggression but attempt have more peace than fighting.  However, Iran continued to arm their surrogates and build their capabilities. Lost in most dialogues about the IDF and their tactics are the original hostages taken a year ago and their rescue.  While almost 100 hostages remain unaccounted for, Israel is in a wider conflict that includes Iran, the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas.  Hostage talks are stalled. IDF officials warned Netanyahu that Hamas ordered guards to execute hostages if they feel the IDF is getting close.  Hamas verified this fact when the terror group executed six hostages in a tunnel in Rafah in late August.  Days later troops operating in the area discovered the bodies and extracted them for burial in Israel.[12]  Escalation against Hamas or Iran may result in continuing degradation or execution of hostages that are still alive.

Conclusion

In terms of Iran, Israel must decide if they want to go back to the previous status quo (which may be unrealistic), strike a long-term blow by targeting Iranian nuclear program infrastructure or concentrating on more short-term objectives like ballistic missile manufacturing, oil facilities and/or leadership targets.  President Biden has attempted to take any attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities off the table and there are reports Israel is talking to the US about other possible targets.  Although the short-term success against Hezbollah will likely mean a lull in attacks from Lebanon, a year of fighting and tens of thousands of casualties in Gaza has not destroyed Hamas (Netanyahu claims they are in mop up operations) nor rescued the remaining hostages.  Attacking nuclear facilities may engender a large, coordinated response from Iran and their proxies.  Attacking oil infrastructure would injure Iran, but also affect global markets.  Targeting leadership in Iran is basically how Israel got here in the first place; leaving attacks against ballistic missile sites and production facilities as the best of the options.  Any other options risk continued costly escalation (in public support, international support, casualties on both sides, and GDP) and strategic failure as each side digs in deeply to “respond” tit-for-tat to violence without a commensurate strategic objective. Israel must view all options at once and determine a strategic outcome, instead of reacting to the last provocation.  So far, the only goal Israel has achieved is getting their enemies to put down their pagers and radios.  Cell phones might be next.

[1] See:  https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/lebanon/#introduction

[2] See:  https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-netanyahus-un-speech-enough-is-enough-he-says-of-hezbollah-also-warns-iran/

[3] See:  https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/mapping-clashes-along-israel-lebanon-border

[4] See:  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-patience/

[5] See:  https://breakingdefense.com/2024/10/israeli-operations-in-lebanon-should-draw-on-lessons-from-the-past/

[6] See:  https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/hezbollahs-rocket-arsenal/

[7] See:  https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-821158

[8] See:  https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c70w1j0l488o

[9] See:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-2-2024

[10] See:  https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-france-backlash-call-israel-arms-embargo-gaza/

[11] See:  https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraqi-forces-decide-keep-out-israels-battles-hezbollah-and-iran

[12] See:  https://www.timesofisrael.com/officials-said-to-warn-pm-that-intel-on-hostages-drying-up-conditions-are-dire/