Does Anyone Want Peace?
Executive Summary
- Israel has been in a continual state of war since 1967, either with major military
operations or in response to constant terrorist attacks. - The current situation is an historic inflection point for Israel. It is an opportunity to
move away from the continual back and forth and possibly achieve real peace that
could last for a generation. Defeat of Iran’s support for their proxy network is key. - In Ukraine, President Putin has popular support and is not interested in ending the
war other than on his terms, which means the annexation of Eastern Ukraine. He
continues to play President Trump’s personality against him, while the US is
focusing on Iran.
The World Situation
The Middle East: Talks…Ceasefire…Attacks…Blockades…Talks…Ceasefire…Attacks. An
almost continuous cycle, yet to many there is no logic or path to peace from any side of the
conflict with Iran and its former proxy network.
There may not be visible logic, but there is rationale, at least when viewing the conflict from
Israel’s perspective. That perspective has largely been ignored by western media and dates
back even before the 1960s. In May 1948, as British forces withdrew from Palestine, Israel
was created despite unresolved disputes over borders, security, land ownership, and other
matters such as control of trade routes. Since then, Israel has fought numerous times
against various enemies in 1948–49, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, 2006, and 2023–present.
The 1967 Six Day War was a watershed event for Israel. The year prior attacks conducted
against Israel by Palestinian guerrilla groups based in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan
increased, generating deadly Israeli reprisal attacks. In November 1966 an Israeli strike on
the village of Al-Samūʿ in the Jordanian West Bank left 18 dead and 54 wounded.
Subsequently in April 1967 Israeli Air Force pilots shot down six Syrian MiGs. In addition,
inaccurate Soviet intelligence reports given to Arab nations in May indicated that Israel was
planning a campaign against Syria. Although inaccurate, the information further heightened
regional tensions. On May 14, 1967, Egyptian President Nasser mobilized forces in the
Sinai, then on May 18 he formally requested the removal of the United Nations
peacekeeping forces stationed there. Four days later he closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli
shipping, instituting an effective blockade of the port of Elat in southern Israel. On May 30,
King Hussein of Jordan arrived in Cairo to sign a mutual defense pact with Egypt, placing
Jordanian forces under Egyptian command; a few days later Iraq joined the alliance. On
June 5 , facing an imminent invasion, Israel attacked.Within hours the air forces of Egypt
and Syria were virtually eliminated, exposing both ground armies to attack. Israel warned
King Hussein to keep Jordan out of the fight, but on June 5 Jordanian forces began shelling
West Jerusalem. The Israeli response was immediate and devastating. On June 7 Israeli
forces drove Jordanian forces out of East Jerusalem and most of the West Bank. Israel has
controlled the West Bank ever since. As with most major conflicts, there were good and bad
outcomes from the brief, but violent war. Israel forestalled a massive attack and likely
ensured national survival but also created hundreds of thousands of refugees and brought
more than one million Palestinians in the occupied territories under Israeli authority. A
continuous progression of terrorist attacks against Israel’s civilian population resulted,
interspersed with major engagements in 1973, 1982, 2006 and finally the Hamas attacks in
2023. These events were supported in large measure by Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Syria,
and Iran.[1]
There has been no real peace in Israel for generations. Now, 59 years after Israel
defended her security against imminent attack is a significant inflection point in their
history. Iraq and Syria are no longer a direct threat (Syria is far from peaceful, however),
and Iran’s Axis of Resistance is severely degraded while the support structure for terror
is continually under attack from Israel and the US. However, continual fighting both in
Gaza and Lebanon gives Iran the excuse to not honor any ceasefire and stall
negotiations hoping for intervention from supporters such as China and Russia or for the
US to finally lose interest and pull out without attaining President Trump’s strategic goals.
These constant operations have caused stress between the two allies as well as given
Iran time to reconstitute their forces while the world’s economy suffers.
Israel wants peace, but not the type of peace that was the core of their existence for so
many years: moments of quiet continually interrupted by terrorist attacks from Gaza, the
West Bank and Lebanon. Israel sees the possibility that they can eliminate the leadership
of both Hamas and Hezbollah and set back their operations significantly. Limiting or
eliminating Iran’s support would be a key ingredient for a long-term peace if it could be
enforced. This would not be a permanent reversal of their situation, however. Nothing
permanent can happen if Iran supports Hezbollah and the religious leadership in the
region continues to call for the destruction of Israel, creating more terrorists willing to
sacrifice their lives for the cause. Negotiations are underway, even while Israel continues
military operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
To be successful, Israeli and Lebanese governments must agree to work together to
disarm Hezbollah. Lebanon’s military capabilities are weak and unable to do this alone
but also civilian leadership in Beirut should publicly decide to work with Israel on
disarming Hezbollah, running the risk of Lebanon’s forces directly fighting Hezbollah. Key
to any success will be US help undercutting Hezbollah’s support from Iran. Some help
has been evident including the US Treasury announcement of sanctions against various
Hezbollah officials that sent clear messages to both Nabih Berri (Hezbollah’s top political
ally in Lebanon and the speaker of parliament for the past 30+ years) and Hezbollah’s
proxies in the armed forces and General Security Directorate. Berri facilitated Hezbollah’s
reconstitution by forcing-friendly appointments in the government and security apparatus,
ensuring that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) could move freely
throughout Lebanon, and disrupting efforts to dismantle Hezbollah’s financial network.
Sanctions need to be followed up with specific messaging from the US about
expectations for Lebanese institutions going forward, and the consequences if these
expectations are not met. For instance, Washington could spell out its red lines regarding
the IRGC’s presence in Lebanon and the timeline for disarmament of Hezbollah. So far,
no such support has materialized.
Iran will not willingly allow Lebanon to become independent of their control. For almost
two years as Israel methodically dismantled Hezbollah leadership, the IRGC began
deploying hundreds of commanders to Lebanon to rebuild and restructure the group.
Today, the IRGC presence in Lebanon is extensive. Israel has released the names of
dozens of IRGC officers killed in action throughout Lebanon, while social media
obituaries reveal various Syrian and Iraqi fighters killed there while operating with
Hezbollah. The IRGC has employed a historical approach, combining fighters from Shia
militias across the region as needed.[2]
For Israel, the successful conclusion of the war against Iran must include the elimination of
Iran’s support to Hezbollah. Otherwise, it will not be “peace” but a return to the back and forth
of the previous 59 years.[3] The price Israel has paid to date likely makes that alternative
unacceptable. For the US, elimination of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and return of the world’s
economy to a more stable, and affordable position before the US mid term elections is primary
while still supporting Israel…at least in public…but tensions continue between Trump ad
Netanyahu. As recently as June 1, Netanyahu had given the order for the IDF to return to
heavy attacks on Dahiyeh, but by that same evening, Trump announced a new ceasefire
between Israel and the Lebanese government, thus blocking the IAF attack.
In a series of awkward statements, Trump vetoed Netanyahu’s attack and leaked that he had
called him “f***ing crazy” for wanting to launch wars all the time, which are leading to him and
Israel being hated around the world. Hezbollah has largely ignored the ceasefire, continuing to
periodically fire rockets into Israel, including over the weekend. Consequently, Israel attacked
on June 7. So the cycle continues, once again.
Ukraine: If Iran is skilled at deflection and changing messages to fit new situations, the
Russians perform this tactic at an Olympic level. Putin is not interested in ending the war other
than on his terms, which means the annexation of Eastern Ukraine and the reportedly 8 million
ethnic Russians living there. Zelenskyy continues to call for direct talks to end the war, even
meeting with Roman Abramovich to use the billionaire as a conduit to Putin.Zelenskyy sent a
clear message for Putin: “We will not leave and we will not go out from our territory, no we will
not give you victory,” he reiterated his request to meet Putin face-to-face. Zelenskyy said the
meeting was “not a secret”, adding that the Russians wanted to know what Kyiv was “ready to
do”. Abramovich has been sanctioned by the UK government after ministers accused him of
having “clear connections” to Putin’s regime, which may make him a more viable conduit for
discussions.
Putin is not talking, except through more military action. A Russian drone struck a storage
facility for spent nuclear fuel near Ukraine’s Chornobyl power plant last weekend. Although
empty, targeting such a sensitive site appears to be a message from Moscow as the conflict
morphs into an ever-intensifying battle of long-range aerial strikes against high-profile locations
on both sides. In addition, Russia fired waves of drones and other munitions at Ukraine on
Sunday 7 June, killing at several people. Dismissing Zelenskyy’s request for a face-to-face
meeting, Putin said there was “no point.” “First, let experts work, work something out, and then
we can meet to sign things,” he said, according to a translation provided by the forum’s
organizers. He also used a well-worn theme of questioning Zelenskyy’s legitimacy to take part
in negotiations, with the 2024 Ukrainian presidential election postponed because of the war.
Playing to Trump’s desire to broker a deal, Putin thanked the president for his efforts to end the
four-year-old conflict. “It’s useful, but there are other things that still need to be done,” he said.
Another deflection.
Shifting the blame for the continual conflict to Trump, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman
Maria Zakharova, suggested Iran has displaced Ukraine as a priority for the White House.
“Unfortunately, they’re paying less attention, and we need them to pay more attention,” she told
NBC News this week, referring to Trump’s efforts to help mediate an end to the war. There is
some truth to this claim. The lines on the ground seem static while the US House of
Representatives has pushed back on Trump, passing legislation providing support for Ukraine
as the nation conducts a sustained campaign against targets more than 1,000 kilometers
behind Russian lines.
Ukraine’s new domestically produced long-range strike drones and cruise missiles are
effective. The economic impact is significant. Putin has centered the Russian economy
around the war, allocating nearly 40% of the federal budget (approximately $238 billion) to
defense and security this year. However, according to a recently leaked warning from the
Russian finance ministry, war spending is on track to overshoot the budget by at least $28B
in 2026, and potentially double that in the ministry’s “negative scenario.” This overshoot
prompted Russian Finance Minister Siluanov to ask the cabinet to freeze trillions of rubles in
civilian spending through 2028. Russia’s deficit hit 5.9 trillion rubles (about $83 billion, or
2.5% of GDP) in the first four months of 2026, while the economy ministry slashed its 2026
growth forecast to just 0.4 percent.[4] As long as the Russian economy can struggle along
without catastrophic failure and the Russian people generally support Putin, the war will
continue. Trump’s efforts to use his personal relationship to convince Putin to end the war
have failed mostly because the discussions were not backed up with more material pressure
on Russia’s leadership and economy. Trump wants peace, but so far words and meetings
have not had the desired outcome.
Conclusion
Israel must decide if they want to go back to the previous status quo (which may be
unrealistic), strike a long-term blow by targeting Iranian support for Hezbollah, or stop and let
a ceasefire take hold while Iran rebuilds their proxy in Lebanon. Israel must view all options
at once and select a strategic goal, instead of reacting to the last provocation. Nothing is
free. Allowing a ceasefire to lead to negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program gives the IRGC
time to reconstitute in Lebanon but also allow Israel a pause while keeping their intelligence
forces occupied tracking IRGC leadership in Iran and Lebanon.Both Trump and Netanyahu
have a vested interest in keeping the relationship relatively free of conflict, but each has their
own strategic goals and pressures to contend with.
Putin, on the other hand, has seemed to survive pressures on his ability to keep fighting,
although the complexion of the conflict has changed significantly. Europe continues to help
Ukraine, and the US Congress seems willing to support Zelenskyy’s government, but in the
meantime civilian and military casualties, as well as refugees, continue to mount.
It may be true that the US, Israel and Ukraine all want peace. But it is a fact that if the other
side is not motivated for peace, no deal will be forthcoming. In Iran, the lack of complete
clarity on who is in charge (IRGC, President, Ayatollah) makes predicting their next moves
more than difficult. The best case would be for President Pezeshkian to exert control over the
IRGC but that is also highly unlikely. The most likely case is continued, if sporadic attacks by
all sides to gain an advantageous position to influence final terms. In any event, Iran,
Hezbollah and Russia all will require more pressure to end their respective conflicts.
About Michael Snodgrass

Michael Snodgrass retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Major General in 2011. He is
currently the President of SG Strategic Solutions LLC.
He has extensive command and leadership experience in the U.S. Air Force and joint
world, as well as a wide range of disciplines, including defense and aerospace,
technology development, government acquisitions and requirements, foreign military
sales and leadership coaching.
He consults with the government, defense industry and other businesses on a wide range
of topics. In 2019 he became an adjunct contract professor supporting the U.S. Air Force
on strategy and policy development.
From 2014 to 2016 he was Vice President, International Business Development at
Raytheon Corp. Prior to that he was Director of U.S. Air Force and Federal Aviation
Administration programs at Engility Corp.
General Snodgrass joined Burdeshaw and Associates in 2012 and is a Senior Consultant
for numerous clients in the defense and aerospace sectors.
Prior to his retirement, he was U.S. Air Force Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for
International Affairs; responsible for formulating and executing USAF Policy, Strategy and
Programs for Building Partnerships and integrating Air Force policy with international
partner goals, totaling over $40 billion total program value.
From 2007 to 2010 he served as the first Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command. There, he
was responsible for the construction of the country’s newest Unified Geographic
Command.
He has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels and has lived in/visited over
50 nations while in uniform. He has over 3500 flight hours in various aircraft including the
F-16, F-15, F-4, C-130 and HH-60, as well as over 100 combat missions in Operation
Desert Storm.
In addition, General Snodgrass teaches leadership and management courses. In his
spare time, he provides leadership coaching and training to the U.S. Air Force ROTC unit
at Florida State University



