Executive Summary

• Intelligence reports concur that an attack of some kind by Iran and/or its proxy network is imminent.
• Tehran cannot defeat Israel militarily nor have substantive effects alone
• Stepping up attacks in the Red Sea will not have any appreciable effect on supply lines, but Iran’s ability to affect global trade is very real in the Strait of Hormuz
• Iran’s calculations must also include the impact on nations like China

Iran vs Israel:  Iran’s Strategy

There have been months of speculation about, and some action by Iran and the Axis of Resistance against Israel.  Reports concur that an attack of some kind is imminent.  For the past 45 years, since the fall of the Shah in 1979, Iran and Israel have been engaged in conflict through the Iranian proxy organization commonly known as the Axis of Resistance, a loose coalition of Sunni and Shia terrorist groups are supported by Iran. They include Hamas (Sunni), Hezbollah (Shia), al-Qaeda (Sunni) who may have differing views on their religion but are united in wanting the destruction of Israel and their US supporters.  Although Hamas is mostly Sunni (like Saudi Arabia) their conflict is fueled by the desire to erase Israel and replace it with a Palestinian state.  Iran, a Shia nation, backs Hamas and other organizations because this coalition can assist Iran in pursuit of their more strategic goal to break the bonds between the US and other Arab nations while also working to eliminate Israel.

In September 2023, Al Jazeera reported that Saudi Arabia was on the verge of normalizing relations with Israel in exchange for a revised US defense agreement and assistance with their civilian nuclear power program.  The Kingdom also wanted progress on a Palestinian state as well as movement on reductions in Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights (Syria).[1]  Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen said in a public interview then that “The gaps can be bridged. I think there is certainly a likelihood that, in the first quarter of 2024, four or five months hence, we will be able to be at a point where the details [of a deal] are finalized.”  Less than a month later, with Iran’s blessing, Hamas attacked Israeli civilians on October 7^th.  This attack, Israel’s response, and the Saudis insistence that a Palestinian state be a priority in any negotiations effectively stalled any progress.

Iran wants to destroy Israel, but also knows they cannot defeat Israel militarily nor have any real effect alone.  It is critical to see the Israel-Hamas war within a broader context: specifically, Iran’s desire to dominate the Middle East. The immediate (media) focus on the operation in the Gaza Strip ignores Iran’s long-term desires and potential risk for the United States and its allies.  Iranian armed forces are among the largest in the Middle East, with at least 580,000 active-duty personnel and about 200,000 trained reserve personnel in the traditional army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.[2]

However, Iran cannot invade Israel.  From the closest point of departure in Iran, across Iraq to Jerusalem is at least 800 miles using established roads.  This trip is equivalent to a trek from Daytona Beach Florida to Washington DC.  The fact that they would have to essentially invade and fight their way across Iraq, with the US still having military forces in country is risky for Tehran at best.  The operation would take weeks if Iraq and the US mount any resistance. Moreover, Iran does not have the logistical infrastructure to support such an operation.  It is simply infeasible for Iran to go overland to Israel.

The same is true for any maritime operation that might take place in the coming year.  Iran has physical control over the Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. These islands are strategically located just outside the Strait of Hormuz, in the Persian Gulf.  In addition, Iran is attempting to expand its Navy’s capability beyond the network of smugglers who help move equipment to their proxy network.  However, the only way Iran can move large ground assault forces would be with the help of a major power like China or Russia, which would bring them into focus vis-à-vis the US.

Finally, the Iranian Air Force is the weakest arm of the Iranian military.  Cut off from supplies and upgrades to new equipment for decades, except for some fighters from Russia (mostly permanently grounded for the same reasons), their Air Force is not a combat threat to Iraq, let alone Israel or the US.  However, their investments in long range missiles and drones have given them a numerically consequential capability that is also subject to many defense systems in Israel.  A direct military confrontation is therefore not possible in the near future.

Iranian strategists are observing how proxy forces and terror might be able to disrupt the Israeli political and social order yet stay short of triggering a full-scale war between Iran and Israel. They appear to think that destabilizing Israel would cause Jewish citizens to flee and end the Jewish state. The commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Major General Hossein Salami, presented his own version of this idea in an interview in August 2022.  Salami articulated a blueprint involving Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Palestinian militias (Hamas) launching protracted ground campaigns from multiple fronts into Israel. Salami explained that these ground forces could liberate territory and advance through Israel gradually. He stated, with no support, that such pressure would disrupt the Israeli political and social order and generate widespread civilian displacement, precluding the need to deal a decisive blow to the IDF.  In his own words: “There is a gap, a kind of inexhaustible political conflict, social disintegration, the lack of a single identity and the lack of a nation within the ruling Zionist regime.”[3]  This is more wishful thinking that fact, however.

This proxy approach in Iran’s view might also be supported by an economic “blockade” against Israel.  The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are part of this strategy and could possibly be supported by similar attacks in the eastern Mediterranean Sea…in their view even west to the Strait of Gibraltar.  In March the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran unsuccessfully pressed Sudan to allow a permanent naval base on the African country’s Red Sea coast, something that would have allowed Tehran to monitor maritime traffic to and from the Suez Canal and Israel, according to a senior Sudanese intelligence official.  Sudan refused, having already been under US scrutiny for using Iranian drones (as well as some from Egypt) in what the Biden Administration called war crimes against civilians.[4]

What is more likely is that proxy organizations like Hamas, the Houthis and Hezbollah along with some overt attack profiles from Iran will constitute any immediate attack.  The objective would be to overwhelm IDF defenses and cause as much damage as possible in retaliation for the killing of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran late last month.

Iran: Possible next moves

The Israeli intelligence community’s most recent assessment is that Iran is poised to attack Israel directly in retaliation for the assassination of Hamas’ political leader in Tehran and is likely to do it within days.[5]  The new intelligence assessment indicates an attack could come before the Gaza hostage and ceasefire deal talks planned for Thursday, potentially jeopardizing negotiations at what Israeli officials have said is a “now-or-never” moment for a potential deal between Israel and Hamas.

If the new President of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, determines that an attack is in the interests of his nation (an unproven assumption) they may combine their response to the July 31 assassination of Ismail Haniyeh with other actions.

Stepping up attacks in the Red Sea will not have any appreciable effect on global supply lines.  Because of the Houthi attacks, volume through the Red Sea and Suez Canal has dropped precipitously from over 600,000 tons per day to below 90,000.  Costs have risen significantly for cargo that must travel around the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa).  Costs of a single container from China/East Asia to the Mediterranean Sea have risen from $1,600 to $5,224 as of February 2024.

However, Iran’s ability to affect global trade is very real in the Strait of Hormuz.  The Strait is the world’s busiest oil transit chokepoint, seeing movement of about 21 million barrels of oil per day or roughly 20% of the world’s consumption.  Intercepting shipping for years, Iran has said it could close the strait at will but has chosen to refrain from that action in the past.  With five naval bases in a very small area, it is possible that Iran can threaten, intercept or destroy enough shipping to considerably limit the supply of crude to the world at least temporarily.

Saudi Arabia can reduce that impact somewhat with their Abqaiq-Yanbu pipeline but only 5,000,000 barrels per day can flow through that route to the Red Sea.[6]  The pipeline was attacked by Houthi forces as recently as 2019, and both the pipeline and the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea are within range of Houthi missile attack.

Would Iran Close the Strait of Hormuz?

Anything is possible and predictability of Iran’s leadership is even less reliable today due to the untested judgment of their new president and his relationship with Supreme Leader Khamenei.  Closing the Strait is possible, if even for only a matter of weeks before the West decides to respond.  In the interim, the effect on the global economy could be severe.  Reducing the flow of oil by approximately 15 million barrels per day (given the capacity of the Abqaiq-Yanbu pipeline) could result in price increases of 20% or greater using the September 2019 attack on the Abqaiq-Yanbu pipeline as a reference point.[7]  Unlike the market response of 2019 however, the final impact might be longer-term than in 2019 given uncertainty due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the possibility of a broader conflict in the middle east as a result of closing the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran’s calculations will also include the impact on their allies and other Gulf state nations.  Although it is unlikely they will have any hesitation to send Hamas and Hezbollah into military action against Israel, China will be severely impacted by any action that restricts oil exports through Hormuz.  Over the past few years China has received from 2.5 to 4 million barrels per day through the strait.  Closing the strait of Hormuz could reduce China’s total imports by as much as 30% until alternative sources are obtained.[8]  Also, military capabilities in Saudi and the UAE are substantial and Iran could rapidly find itself at the receiving end of military operations from other Arab nations.

Conclusion

Iran may soon orchestrate a coordinated attack against Israel as intelligence indicates.  Iran believes it must respond to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in some fashion and show their Axis of Resistance that they have some skin in the game.  Coordinating Houthis attacks against oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia with Hamas and Hezbollah attacks in Israel while at the same time closing the straits of Hormuz, even temporarily, could send shock waves through global markets.  This very complex, overtly hostile and provocative action would also bring unwanted attention from the US as well as others such as China.  Iran’s new president will be assessed by both the Ayatollah and the international community as he choses which path to pursue.

About Michael Snodgrass

Michael Snodgrass retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Major General in 2011. He is currently the President of SG Strategic Solutions LLC.

He has extensive command and leadership experience in the U.S. Air Force and joint world, as well as a wide range of disciplines, including defense and aerospace, technology development, government acquisitions and requirements, foreign military sales and leadership coaching.

He consults with the government, defense industry and other businesses on a wide range of topics. In 2019 he became an adjunct contract professor supporting the U.S. Air Force on strategy and policy development.

From 2014 to 2016 he was Vice President, International Business Development at Raytheon Corp. Prior to that he was Director of U.S. Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration programs at Engility Corp.

General Snodgrass joined Burdeshaw and Associates in 2012 and is a Senior Consultant for numerous clients in the defense and aerospace sectors. Prior to his retirement, he was U.S. Air Force Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs; responsible for formulating and executing USAF Policy, Strategy and Programs for Building Partnerships and integrating Air Force policy with international partner goals, totaling over $40 billion total program value.

From 2007 to 2010 he served as the first Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command. There, he was responsible for the construction of the country’s newest Unified Geographic Command.

He has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels and has lived in/visited over 50 nations while in uniform. He has over 3500 flight hours in various aircraft including the F-16, F-15, F-4, C-130 and HH-60, as well as over 100 combat missions in Operation Desert Storm.

In addition, General Snodgrass teaches leadership and management courses. In his spare time, he provides leadership coaching and training to the U.S. Air Force ROTC unit at Florida State University.

[1] See:  https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/21/whats-happening-with-normalising-ties-between-saudi-arabia-and-israel

[2] See:  https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/the-military-balance/

[3] See:  https://farsi.khamenei.ir/others-dialog?id=50786

[4] See:  https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tried-to-persuade-sudan-to-allow-naval-base-on-its-red-sea-coast-77ca3922

[5] See:  https://www.axios.com/2024/08/11/iran-attack-israel-intelligence-updated

[6] See:  https://www.strausscenter.org/strait-of-hormuz-alternate-export-routes/

[7] See:  https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11173

[8] See:  https://www.statista.com/statistics/1310953/oil-imports-by-country-china/#:~:text=Crude%20oil%20import%20volume%20in%20China%202022%2D2023%2C%20by%20country&text=In%202023%2C%20Russia%20became%20China’s,countries%20in%20the%20Middle%20East.