Executive Summary
Iran refuses to acknowledge any linkage between their agreement to stop hostilities and current actions, which violate that same agreement.
Tehran’s rope-a-dope attrition strategy has strained the US weapons arsenal while they still can threaten civilian infrastructure across the Middle East.
Iran has proven once again that negotiating in good faith is not in the cards.
It remains to be seen if the US has learned any substantive lessons at a strategic level.

Current Situation
It appears, as of mid-day on 8 July, that the ceasefire with Iran has been terminated. As with most things in the Trump Administration however, keeping abreast of developments is full-time endeavor. Although some in the media term the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as a
peace deal, it is nothing of the sort but merely an agreement to halt hostilities while a “Final Agreement” is negotiated. That said, President Trump said the MOU to stop hostilities with Iran was “over” and that the US was likely to launch new strikes on Wednesday night following
Iranian attacks on US bases and shipping in the Gulf. The price of oil has bounced higher, again, while Iran said it only targeted US military sites in Bahrain and Kuwait after U.S. forces struck Iranian targets (in response to attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz). After many days of
saying there was a deal in place and stopping short of declaring complete victory, the President backed away from any such statements saying, “If we make a deal with Iran I’m not sure that will stick,” Trump said, “because I found them to be very dishonorable people.”[1] US Central
Command (CENTCOM) launched a “series of powerful strikes” on Iran Tuesday in response to Iranian attacks on three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. CENTCOM said the operation targeted air defenses, radar sites and anti-ship missile sites, as well as dozens of small boats used by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. The US Treasury Department on Tuesday revoked a waiver allowing Iran to sell oil and petrochemicals, eliminating the revenue source negotiated in the MOU. A US official said in a statement that “Iran’s actions in the Strait were wholly unacceptable to the United States and will be met with consequences.”

To the likely dismay of forces in theater, Trump said the US will “very probably hit” Iran again Wednesday night and seemed to threaten to bring back the naval blockade as well as intimidated a “take over” of Iran’s Karg Island after the two sides traded strikes Tuesday.[2] From the NATO summit in Turkey, Trump said he believed the memorandum of understanding “is over,” but that talks could continue. In a politically adept move, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte defended the latest US airstrikes on Iran, accusing Tehran of violating the cease-fire and saying it was crucial that Washington ‘forcefully react’ despite Trumps opening comments slamming NATO and Europe for not supporting the US in their attacks on Iran (although the US left Europe and NATO completely in the dark as to the administrations intentions in February.) At the end of the summit, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul while urging the US and Iran to resume negotiations, said Germany is prepared to help clear mines in the Strait of Hormuz.

Despite agreeing to allow ships to transit the straits, Iran continues to attack shipping, neighboring states and US installations. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf — a key negotiator in last month’s US-Iran memorandum of understanding — accused the US of several “major” violations late on July 7th. n a post on X, Ghalibaf pointed to the US’s recent strikes on Iran and Treasury’s waiver revocation. He also criticized the US’s “persistent threats of future strikes” and Israel’s conflict with the Iranian-backed militant group Hezbollah in Lebanon.[3]

Iran refuses to acknowledge any linkage between their agreement to stop hostilities and current actions which violate that same agreement. Iran’s foreign ministry said the US response to the attacks on shipping were a clear violation of the MOU with the US and a major handicap moving forward. The IRGC said it has struck close to 85 locations in Bahrain and Kuwait in response, including the US Fifth Fleet and the Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait. Iran’s military leadership had promised a crushing response.

Iran wants to keep their nuclear program in some form, but they now use intimidation and attempts to control or disrupt shipping in the strait as their primary weapon against the US. Iran has warned for years it could close the strait, at one point saying it would be “as easy as
drinking a glass of water”, but privately senior officials were reluctant to do so and viewed it as a weapon of last resort. This move was predicted by years of war gaming and analysis but dismissed by the US administration as “unlikely” because they thought Iran’s leadership would
seek peace immediately instead of suffering waves of strikes from the US military. Addressing the United States Ebrahim Azizi, a member of the Iranian parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee wrote on social media that the US should… “Recognize the new
Iranian order in the Strait of Hormuz: this is the only way forward.” Clearly. the US leadership misread Iran’s commitment to staying in power.

Iranian officials have maintained that the management of the Strait of Hormuz is a monopoly and will only be managed by Iran and other states, such as Oman. While making these statements, Iran’s government continues to oppress their population. January 2026 saw nationwide protests that resulted in Iranian Security forces’ using lethal force against protesters with deaths reported anywhere from 7,000 to over 30,000. This followed an increase in large scale executions and arbitrary arrests of protesters by the Iranian government in 2025.

Good News
The US military has shown the world their unmatched ability to rapidly deploy massive amounts of air and sea power and operate as a joint force. Through US Admiral Brad Cooper’s leadership, the US military also deepened relationships with Middle Eastern militaries, especially with the Israeli armed forces, fighting a coalition campaign on a scale not seen since World War II. The US flew over 10,000 air sorties, hit over 130,000 targets, and intercepted 1,700 Iranian missiles and drones. According to U.S. Central Command, the campaign demolished more than 85% of Tehran’s missile and drone production facilities, sank virtually all of Iran’s navy, and eliminated 70 percent of its missile launch infrastructure. It is likely that the initial degradation of Iran’s nuclear capabilities was reinforced in Epic Fury, although to what extent is yet unknown.

In addition, Iran’s attacks on gulf neighbors, seen as an effort to drive a wedge between the US and Gulf allies, actually had the opposite effect. Despite some unfortunate incidents, military cooperation was strengthened. Gulf countries were previously reluctant to be associated with
offensive US military operations out of fear of offending Iran. During this period, some Gulf countries permitted Central Command to launch strikes from their territories, and there are reports that Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined the United States and Israel in striking Iran. These are unprecedented improvements in military-to-military relationships.

The critical assistance the US provided to Israel and the Gulf states during the crisis, and the substantial investments in equipment Gulf partners had already made purchasing and training on US systems, means that these militaries will almost certainly continue to buy American and
train with Central Command, drawing them closer to the US as a result.

Bad News
However, all the good news is at the operational and tactical level. At the strategic level the picture is not as rosy. Degrading Iran’s military capabilities was not listed in the strategic goals Trump laid out in the early days of Epic Fury. He variously promised to achieve complete
“unconditional” surrender of the regime, protect the Iranian people from their leaders’ brutality and set the conditions for them to overthrow the regime, to rid the region of Iran’s influence entirely, and to force a better nuclear deal from Tehran than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action in 2015. None of these goals have been accomplished. The regime survived. Tehran has adopted a rope-a-dope attrition strategy which has strained the U.S. weapons arsenal while threatening civilian infrastructure across the Middle East. Now, they have a new element of
power, proving they can effectively close the Strait of Hormuz and put significant pressure on the global economy.

Washington wants out of the conflict, almost at any cost. When one side wants out, and the other side knows that desire, the first party loses any advantage or negotiating power. In addition, the US must avoid a trust deficit with its Gulf if it pulls out of the region prematurely and without achieving any of the strategic goals. Now that nations in the region have essentially picked a side, that is, not Iran’s side, they are at risk from Iran and will need more security commitments than before. Washington must ensure Gulf nations know the US supports their security, despite the fact the American public quickly lost any enthusiasm for putting forward the effort and resources to counter Iran.

Finally, the US military expended an exceptional number of munitions to strike targets in Iran. US military fired more than 1,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles in a few weeks, but industry is only currently tooled and trained to produce 90 to 100 per year. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, to counter Iranian missile fire, the United States expended at least 190 THAAD interceptors and 1,200 Patriot interceptors by April 8 alone. Those figures represented around 53 percent and 46 percent of the United States’ prewar inventories, respectively. At current replenishment rates the United States could not counter air threats in multiple theaters if it needed to. Not only do the military and Congress know about these shortfalls, but potential aggressors now know as well.[4]

Conclusion
Iran has proven once again that negotiating in good faith is not in the cards. Their success in keeping the US guessing while executing more delaying tactics will help them recover from sanctions and military defeats on the battlefield. They will use Hezbollah to attack Israel and
then claim any ceasefire will be cancelled when Israel retaliates. They will eventually rebuild their offensive drone and missile capability as well as some of their defenses and obfuscate discussions on their enriched uranium and nuclear program as long as possible. Iran will also go
to great lengths to hide and protect their remaining leadership from air attack while suppressing political dissent. With their newly established weapon, closure of the strait, they will attempt to blackmail the world to get what they want at the negotiating table. This will likely crystalize allied support against Iran, but that may take some time.

It remains to be seen if the US has learned any substantive lessons at a strategic level. Not informing and including allies prior to conflict, not selling the seriousness of a nuclear armed Iran as a threat to national security to allies and the American people, not developing a clear linkage between tactical success and strategic victory (e.g., which and how do tactical successes coalesce to achieve strategic goals?), not examining and developing courses of action for worse case alternatives (closure of the straits for example) and finally, not pursuing diplomatic avenues when they were open are all lessons that should have been learned by this administration.

[1] See: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-targets-sites-bahrain-kuwait-after-wave-us-strikes-2026-07-08/
[2] Trump has consistently telegraphed US Military plans to attack in advance of strikes. This can have the effect of putting Americans at more risk because Iran is alerted to the possibility. On the other hand, Iran is so militarily depleted that the risk may be very small.
[3] See: https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2074681304625369519

[4] See: https://www.aei.org/op-eds/rebuilding-the-arsenal-of-democracy/

 

About Michael Snodgrass

Michael Snodgrass retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Major General in 2011. He is currently the President of SG Strategic Solutions LLC.

He has extensive command and leadership experience in the U.S. Air Force and joint world, as well as a wide range of disciplines, including defense and aerospace, technology development, government acquisitions and requirements, foreign military sales and leadership coaching.

He consults with the government, defense industry and other businesses on a wide range of topics. In 2019 he became an adjunct contract professor supporting the U.S. Air Force on strategy and policy development.

From 2014 to 2016 he was Vice President, International Business Development at Raytheon Corp. Prior to that he was Director of U.S. Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration programs at Engility Corp.

General Snodgrass joined Burdeshaw and Associates in 2012 and is a Senior Consultant for numerous clients in the defense and aerospace sectors. Prior to his retirement, he was U.S. Air Force Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs; responsible for formulating and executing USAF Policy, Strategy and Programs for Building Partnerships and integrating Air Force policy with international partner goals, totaling over $40 billion total program value.

From 2007 to 2010 he served as the first Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command. There, he was responsible for the construction of the country’s newest Unified Geographic Command.

He has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels and has lived in/visited over 50 nations while in uniform. He has over 3500 flight hours in various aircraft including the F-16, F-15, F-4, C-130 and HH-60, as well as over 100 combat missions in Operation Desert Storm.

In addition, General Snodgrass teaches leadership and management courses. In his spare time, he provides leadership coaching and training to the U.S. Air Force ROTC unit at Florida State University.