Iran: Trump’s Vietnam
Executive Summary
- The carrot and (short) stick approach has failed. Iran believes it can outwait the US
- The US has control of gulf airspace and parts of southern and western Iran, but not enough to preclude Iran’s use of missiles against shipping and bases in the region
- The fact missile stockpiles are low does not mean the US has no capability to conduct successful operations
- There is no linkage between US tactical strikes and strategic goals for the conflict
- Totaling the numbers of missile sites and production infrastructure hit in Iran is frighteningly similar to the number counting used in the Vietnam War
Current Situation
Pick any date in the past 4 months and you can find announcements by the Administration that attacks will be stopped because Iran is finally willing to negotiate for peace, or that attacks will restart in earnest to force a deal, or Iran says it is not in negotiations with the US. For Iran, talks with Oman are far different than talks with the US but for President Trump any talks with Iran are done with his approval and for his goals to be achieved. The carrot and (short) stick approach with Iran has failed numerous times and will fail again as long as Iran believes it can outwait the US, particularly in light of reports the US is “running out of missiles”.
Political
The political situation is complex, fraught with contradicting statements from the major players and assumptions about adversaries that do not stand the light of day. Despite President Trump’s statements that talks were underway, and that (once again) planned strikes would be postponed, the Iranian foreign ministry rejected Trump’s suggestion that talks were under way, noting that Iran hadn’t sent any delegations or negotiators to take part in any discussions. He said all of Iran’s negotiators were still in country, with the exception of Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who was visiting a religious site in Iraq. Iran’s Foreign Ministry did acknowledge that Iran was continuing talks with Oman on how to manage the Strait of Hormuz, but this is far short of peace talks. It is likely the reported call from the Saudi Crown Prince had an impact on Trump. The prince spoke to Trump about the intensifying crisis between Washington and Tehran, urging a renewed push for dialogue instead of renewed military attacks, hours before the President halted his latest attacks on Iran.
The Saudi Press Agency (SPA) reported on Sunday that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) spoke to Trump by phone and “stressed the need to prioritize dialogue to reduce escalation and the importance of making every possible effort to achieve calm that paves the way for diplomatic solutions”.[1]
In a social-media post Monday, Trump described Iran’s leadership as “unbelievably duplicitous,” saying they had asked for talks on ending the war and then announced that no discussions were being held. In any event it is probable that Trump was swayed by the prospect of direct Saudi involvement alongside Qatar, Pakistan and Oman. This would have the effect of putting regional powers at the point of any discussions, allowing senior leaders in the region more responsibility for finding a solution to the crisis. MBS was motivated by two factors: Iran’s ability to strike oil fields and refining capabilities in the gulf, and the resultant destruction and misery that US strikes would visit on Iran’s people while perhaps having marginal effect on Iran’s leadership.
Tactical
The tactical situation is that the US has control of the airspace over the gulf, and part of southern and western Iran, but not enough control to preclude Iran’s use of surface-to-surface missiles against shipping as well as US and allied bases in the region. Four weeks into this conflict, the United States had struck more than 10,000 Iranian targets, destroyed roughly 80% of Iran’s air defense capabilities, and eliminated its navy as a fighting force. Yet the strait remains effectively closed because Iran’s drones and missiles are still a viable threat. Estimates vary but likely drone and missile inventories that are accessible (not buried under tons of rock and debris) range from 1000 to 1500. Many of these can cover the gulf as well as Israel and all can interdict shipping, albeit infrequently, but often enough to cause shippers to decide against running the drone gauntlet for fear of attack. This despite reports from U.S. Central Command that allied strikes damaged or destroyed over 66% to 85% of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone, and naval defense industrial production base and manufacturing facilities. Iran has enough capability to stretch out the conflict for many more months unless a change is made to the US approach.
Iran still believes that the US wants a peace deal at any cost, and they can use that as leverage to retain their nuclear program and impose tolls or fees on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran also believes the US Congress and Americans will tire of the war and force President Trump to end the conflict on any terms. Reports of US missile inventory shortages are fueling these beliefs.
Standoff missiles can be a very powerful weapon in war, both in terms of attacking enemy positions and capabilities and defending against an enemy attack. In terms of long-range strike, both Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM) are now in very short supply as the war has used a considerable amount of these systems. Regarding defending against enemy missile strikes, the Patriot and THAAD systems are well below pre-conflict levels, adding to the risk of winning a conflict in other theaters such as against China. Both these types of systems are designed to allow successful operations without putting American troops at increased risk. The Defense Department is moving to address these shortfalls. On August 3rd the DoD announced framework agreements with Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin to expand production of Patriot and THAAD interceptor components to replenish missile inventories through long-term contracts.[1] Instead of traditional year to year procurement approaches which are used to manage budgets instead of weapons inventories, officials said the agreements will support a long-term procurement objective of nearly 14,000 Patriot and THAAD interceptors by providing sustained demand signals to critical suppliers throughout the defense industrial base. If approved by Congress, this approach could triple production capacity for Patriot Advanced Capability-3, or PAC-3 interceptors and quadruple production capacity for THAAD interceptors.[2] Unfortunately, DoD also said it will work directly with key component suppliers instead of relying solely on prime contractors, encouraging investment in advanced tooling, facility modernization and workforce development needed to sustain higher production rates. This is unfortunate because the DoD lacks both contractual authority and skilled and experienced personnel to work directly with sub-contractors. Encouraging capital investments of sub-contractors without the involvement of the prime contractor as well as long-term commitments sounds good to the uneducated, but in practice will be difficult and likely ineffective.
The fact these stockpiles are depleted, however, does not mean the US has lost the capability or capacity to conduct successful operations against Iran’s missile launch and production infrastructure. It means any operations will require packages of air forces, supported by myriad capabilities, to penetrate Iran’s airspace and eliminate targets that could force Iran to the negotiating table. Bombs guided by GPS and Laser systems are extremely effective but require our Airmen to close on their targets and, in most cases, overfly Iran’s territory. This is higher risk, but not unacceptable risk because the forces have stealth, some amount of standoff, and electronic support capabilities to reduce risk to air crews from surface to air defense systems. These systems will be located and targeted prior to Airmen attacking ballistic missile sites and support.
Aircraft strikes are not without risk. Iran has their own shortfalls and has reportedly finalized a deal with China for surface to air missile replacements. Within weeks Iran is expected to receive their first shipment of as many as 400 Chinese-made shoulder-fired air defense missile launchers as it rebuilds its defenses. The purchase, valued at $60-$70 million, is a significant effort to strengthen its short-range air defenses. These systems will be of little value against aircraft flying above 20,000 feet or standing off more than 4 to 5 miles from their targets, but they could be a significant addition to naval defenses against helicopters and low flying aircraft in and around the gulf and strait. Iran has longer range systems that can be a threat to high and fast flying aircraft, and when they are brought out of hiding, they are vulnerable to allied attack. The bottom line is that a military campaign that uses aircraft instead of surface-to-surface missiles entails some risk but is also achievable.
Strategic
Iran’s strategy is to wait out the administration, hit frequently but limited so their resources can choke off the strait to cause enough economic turmoil and political disagreement as possible until the US finally gives up. Unlike the early stages of the conflict when Iran’s leadership was targeted, now the strikes are limited, and inevitably when the campaign begins to take effect the President calls off or delays strikes because of an impending peace deal that never materializes. There is still no linkage between US tactical activities and the strategic goals for the conflict from the US side. Essentially the US is a superpower who declines to use that power in a way to force a conclusion. Totaling the numbers of missile sites and production infrastructure hit in Iran is frighteningly similar to the number counting in Vietnam…using tactical success on the ground to assert movement toward a strategic goal of peace that never happened. There is no linkage because the US consistently stops short of waging a campaign that will drive Iran’s leaders into a place where their survival is at risk if they do not come to the table and negotiate in good faith.
The Strait of Hormuz
Iran has moved away from “tolls” to a discussion about imposing “transit fees” on international shipping. Transit fees, or tolls, are a way for Iran to move the discussion away from their nuclear program and force the US to talk about shipping through the strait. This approach has been essentially successful, even with the change in terms, because of the pressure domestically and internationally on the administration to find a solution. President Trump has resisted backing down but has also declined to follow the path he chose five months ago. Fees, or tolls, would have a very detrimental effect on international commerce. Recently eight of the world’s largest shipping industry associations urged the United Nations and International Maritime Organization to oppose any mandatory fees, tolls or transit charges in the Strait of Hormuz, stating that such a move would set a precedent for similar fees at other key maritime chokepoints. The groups said introducing transit tolls or service fees “that are a toll in all but name” would undermine the international legal framework governing navigation through international straits. Such fees would be eventually passed on to consumers, causing world-wide inflation to spike.
In July in another move that can only be called amateurish, President Trump, without consulting any ally in the region, briefly floated imposing a 20% charge on cargo shipments crossing with U.S. assistance, only to back away from the plan after allies in the Gulf reacted badly to the idea. There is no resolution to this debate as the parties continue to talk past each other and make announcements immediately rebuked by the other.
Conclusion
Iran will not negotiate in good faith. They will play a waiting game of tit for tat strikes betting on the US to lose resolve and quit the conflict, giving them a real victory over the “Great Satan”. The US has few options, none of them rooted in diplomacy. The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve emergency stockpiles are at their lowest levels since the early 1980s; commercial inventories have shrunk, too, as oil exports have surged. Profits by oil companies are surging with the higher prices, causing Trump to divert attention from the failed strategy to companies like Chevron and ExxonMobil who he says are “making too much money” and should return some of their profits back to the public.[1] Congress may reassert itself after the mid-term elections forcing a showdown with the administration and a president clearly conflicted between winning a war that he should not have started and suing for peace to correct the economic imbalance it has caused.
The debate over Iran’s nuclear program has left the headlines but is likely still at the forefront of the negotiating team’s agenda. Regime change in Iran is likely not going to resurface during the Trump administration. Any deal will likely have connective tissue with the June memorandum but may not be a carbon copy. Markets will like price in hope over actual progress moving forward and could see a major military campaign by the US as a negative instead of a positive. In fact, it is neither…it is the reality of what levers the administration has left to pull to force a conclusion by finally tying tactical actions to achievement of their strategic goals.
About Michael Snodgrass
Michael Snodgrass retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Major General in 2011. He is currently the President of SG Strategic Solutions LLC.
He has extensive command and leadership experience in the U.S. Air Force and joint world, as well as a wide range of disciplines, including defense and aerospace, technology development, government acquisitions and requirements, foreign military sales and leadership coaching.
He consults with the government, defense industry and other businesses on a wide range of topics. In 2019 he became an adjunct contract professor supporting the U.S. Air Force on strategy and policy development.
From 2014 to 2016 he was Vice President, International Business Development at Raytheon Corp. Prior to that he was Director of U.S. Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration programs at Engility Corp.
General Snodgrass joined Burdeshaw and Associates in 2012 and is a Senior Consultant for numerous clients in the defense and aerospace sectors. Prior to his retirement, he was U.S. Air Force Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs; responsible for formulating and executing USAF Policy, Strategy and Programs for Building Partnerships and integrating Air Force policy with international partner goals, totaling over $40 billion total program value.
From 2007 to 2010 he served as the first Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command. There, he was responsible for the construction of the country’s newest Unified Geographic Command.
He has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels and has lived in/visited over 50 nations while in uniform. He has over 3500 flight hours in various aircraft including the F-16, F-15, F-4, C-130 and HH-60, as well as over 100 combat missions in Operation Desert Storm.
In addition, General Snodgrass teaches leadership and management courses. In his spare time, he provides leadership coaching and training to the U.S. Air Force ROTC unit at Florida State University.