Israel vs Iran: What’s Next?

Executive Summary
- Israel and the US have long viewed a nuclear armed Iran as an existential threat to Israel and US allies in the region.
- Days of attacks and increases in threatening rhetoric on all sides seem to feed a continuation of hostilities for the next several days, perhaps weeks.
- Any escalation against the US by Iran would be a major, and fatal, decision.
Iran: Long simmering threat to Israel, the West and its neighbors
In June 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution which, for the first time since 2005, formally declared Iran was non-compliant with its obligation to ensure nuclear weapons are not produced by its program.[1] In response Iran announced a number several measures intended to accelerate its nuclear program.[2]
History
Since Shah’s fall in 1979 the Islamic Revolution has been dedicated to Israels destruction. In 2002, almost a year after 9/11, western intelligence disclosed Iran had built the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility. After six months of negotiation, Iran suspended uranium enrichment there. When hard liner President Ahmadinejad was elected in 2006, he announced Iran’s intent to restart uranium enrichment. Secret, unproductive negotiations were restarted in 2009 by the Obama Administration through Oman. Despite this outreach, the lack of progress resulted in a computer virus attack by Israel (perhaps with US assistance) that shut down Iran’s centrifuges. Iran’s 2015 agreement to limit enrichment in exchange for lifting economic sanctions imploded three years later when Israel disclosed Iran had hidden its program before signing the pact. President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement soon after. For the next 10 years explosions and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists did not convince Iran to stop their enrichment program for weapons grade uranium. Iran is currently enriching uranium to 60%, significantly beyond the 3.67% allowed under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and far beyond levels necessary for civilian nuclear power. Monthly production capacity has increased fivefold since last year. Israel and the United States have long viewed a nuclear armed Iran as an existential threat to Israel and US allies in the region.
Not content to only pursue nuclear weapons, Iran supported Hamas’ attack against Israeli civilians on October 7, 2023. Iran’s Axis of Resistance included Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Palestine Liberation Organization, and no less than six other military brigades all dedicated to the liberation of Palestine through the destruction of Israel. Twelve days after the 7 October attack, Yemen’s Houthi’s launched ballistic missiles and drones against Israel and have continued attacking ships in the Red Sea, severely complicating international commerce through the Suez Canal.
Since then, Israel, with the support of the US, has conducted a campaign to reduce if not eliminate the Axis of Resistance and its sponsor, Iran. Israel targeted two Iranian generals in Damascus in April 2024, which elicited a (largely ineffective) response directly against Israel by Iran. Israeli strikes have eliminated leadership of Hamas, Hezbollah and now Iran in various ways that include direct action and covert attacks using explosive-laden cell phones and pagers, and drones smuggled into Iran. Since June 13th, Israel has conducted an intense offensive against Iran’s nuclear capability as well as the leadership of the Revolutionary Guards killing almost 20 senior members.
Israel and the US are concerned that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons continues, and their leadership is undeterred. Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium (at varying degrees of enrichment) is currently over 40 times permitted under the JCPOA, and it continues to expand its enrichment capabilities by installing additional more advanced centrifuges. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated in 2022 that Iran would have the technological capability required to successfully construct a deliverable nuclear weapon in one to two years.[3] It appears Israel waited as long as possible to allow negotiations to alter Iran’s trajectory prior to making the decision to reduce the threat with direct action.
Iran’s military response has been largely ineffective. The IAF reports intercepting between 80% to 90% of Iranian missiles launched against targets in Israel. There is speculation the US is considering joining Israel as President Trump has called for Iran’s “unconditional surrender” but has also evidently restrained Israel from killing the supreme leader. This carrot and stick type approach is typical of Trump tactics to set out an almost unreachable goal (surrender) while also letting it be known he has other options. The report that Israel was constrained from killing the Supreme Leader infers that Israel (and possibly the US) have precise intelligence on the Ayatollah’s location at any given time. As of Wednesday June 18, Iran has rejected calls for surrender and continues to attack.
Potential Next Steps
It is not immediately likely the US will do more than materially assist Israel in defense of their airspace against Iran’s drones and missiles. For the US to enter this war is a major decision that will garner immediate censure from some in Congress and other world leaders (who were once staunch allies). If Trump thinks it is the right decision, any negatives will be dismissed. Leaving the door open to a possible US entry allows for circumstances on the ground to change. Such change could be an inability by Israel to effectively roll back the nuclear program or successfully target Iran’s leadership to make them ineffective. A third option for bringing the US into direct attacks would be if Iran or its proxies launched attacks against US personnel or facilities in the region or in the States. US deployments into theater have clearly positioned the US military for such an operation if Iran forces Trump’s hand.
Israel’s problem is although they can identify facilities and locations of key personnel, verifying the destruction of nuclear capability (enriched material and delivery vehicles) is more difficult. This uncertainty may force Israel to continue attacks for many more days to ensure they set back the Iranian program several years. The people of Tehran appear to believe this is a possibility, as highways are jammed leading out of the city of 10 million.
Conclusions
Trump likely sees a call for unconditional surrender as a negotiation tactic while the Ayatollah clearly considers it an insult. Israel needs several more days to ensure complete or at least substantive destruction of Iran’s program, and the US needs to find a way to rachet down their rhetoric in a way that allows Iran to back off of their often-over-the-top responses. Any escalation against the US by Iran would be a major, and fatal, decision.
[1] See: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-38.pdf
[2] See: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10284/
[3] See: https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2022/the-status-of-negotiations-over-irans-nuclear-programme
Learn more about the author, Advisory Board member and retired U.S. Air Force Major General Michael Snodgrass.