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Putin the Strategist

Executive Summary

  • Putin does not want peace. His is a history of broken promises.  His goals are fueled by history, military superiority in the region and economics.
  • The 28-point peace plan came from a paper submitted to the US by Russia in October. SecState Rubio characterized it as a “wish list”.
  • The plan contains many red herrings for the West and puts the US in the position of bringing Europe to heel for any possible agreement. Putin knew this from the start.

Does Putin want Peace?

Putin has a checkered ledger when it comes to keeping his promises and upholding peace agreements.  President Trump may think Putin wants peace, but the history of agreements with Putin is a study in duplicity.  The Budapest Memorandum in 1994 was an agreement for Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees from the U.S., U.K. and Russia. Moscow explicitly promised to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and refrain from economic coercion.  Then in 2003 Russia began building a dam on the Ukrainian island of Tuzla without warning or permission from Kyiv. Ukraine responded by deploying troops. The crisis ended only after Ukrainian President Kuchma agreed to a compromise on terms favorable to Moscow.

Over the next decade, Ukraine attempted to strengthen political and economic ties with Western Europe. Moscow responded with energy extortion to draw Kyiv closer and weaponized trade with Ukraine. In 2013 Moscow blocked Ukrainian exports at the border while offering financing for the Ukrainian government as an inducement for closer ties.

Ukrainian President Yanukovych acceded to the economic coercion and withdrew from a political association and free-trade agreement with the European Union in November 2013. Russia had threatened serious sanctions for Ukraine should Kyiv sign the Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU) and even started a new trade war by imposing a ban on Ukrainian cheese imports.  These moves prompted mass protests in Ukraine, resulting in the resignation of President Yanukovych who then fled to Russia in February 2014.  Russia used that event to send troops, in disguise, to seize Crimea and the strategic port of Sevastopol. It also armed pro-Russian separatists who launched a war in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region and seized much of two eastern provinces while claiming its military wasn’t involved in the fighting in eastern Ukraine.  Ukrainians tried to liberate Ilovaisk (a city in Donetsk) in August 2014 but were surrounded by Russian forces. Putin personally called for a “humanitarian corridor” so Ukrainian troops could retreat to safety. As soon as the Ukrainians laid down their arms, the Russians ambushed and slaughtered more than 360 retreating soldiers.  Despite this, President Obama refused lethal aid for Ukraine while Washington and Europe pushed Kyiv to negotiate a cease-fire. Ukraine agreed under U.S. and German pressure to the Minsk I accord in late 2014 that promised a cease-fire. It didn’t hold and in early 2015 Ukraine agreed to Minsk II.  Putin claimed Russia wasn’t a party to Minsk II, because the deal was only between Ukraine and Russian separatists in the Donbas. Concurrently, the Kremlin poured heavy weapons into the Donbas in preparation for what became the 2022 invasion.[1]  It is clear that Putin has executed a long-term strategy for control of Eastern Ukraine, including the Crimea.  Clearly peace, in Putin’s view, means the occupation of Ukraine and its capitulation to Russia’s demands.

What does Putin want in Ukraine? 

In April 2008 Russian president Putin repeated his warning that Moscow would view any attempt to expand NATO to its borders as a “direct threat”.  This followed Ukraine’s unsuccessful attempt to secure a Membership Action Plan (MAP) with NATO, the first step toward attaining NATO membership.  Soon after these statements, Putin stepped down from his post as President, only to return six years later and order the invasion of Crimea.

Putin’s interest in Ukraine is historic, militarily strategic, and economical.  In 2021 Putin authored an article that laid out the history of Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine dating back to the 9th Century and “Ancient Rus”.  This area was the largest state in Europe. Slavic and other tribes from Ladoga, Novgorod, and Pskov to Kiev and Chernigov, were bound together by one language (Old Russian), economic ties, the rule of the princes of the Rurik dynasty, and the Orthodox faith. In the 19-page monogram Putin walks through each century, leader, war, uprising and treaty through November 1917 and creation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic as part of Russia. Through the creation of the USSR after WWI and post-WWII Putin argues that “…modern Ukraine is entirely the product of the Soviet era. We know and remember well that it was shaped – for a significant part – on the lands of historical Russia.”  He ends by saying: “I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia.”[2]

Militarily Russia has access through Crimea to the Black Sea and no longer needs to pay rent to the Ukrainian government for the port or access.  In addition, Putin wants complete sovereignty over all areas as well as limitations on Ukraine’s military, NATO troop deployment, a NATO membership ban and “security guarantees” from Russia (which is code for Russia having the legal ability to invade and occupy Ukraine at some future date under some pretense).  These conditions would allow Russia the ability to restart hostilities against a more militarily depleted and economically weak Ukraine and prohibit any interference from NATO nations on Ukraine’s behalf.

Given the historical groundwork and military benefits of a peace in Russia’s interest, Putin’s economic ambitions are clear.  Ukraine’s Dnieper-Donetsk region contains about 80% of Ukraine’s known conventional oil, gas, and coal production and reserves. Many critical minerals, especially Ukraine’s 22 rare earth elements, are concentrated in Donetsk, Dobra, and Kruta Balka. In addition, several critical products such as barley, corn, and sunflower oil are harvested in eastern and southeastern Ukraine. Control over these resources from food to rare earth elements is central to Ukraine’s recovery or Russia’s economic future.

Within months of invading Ukraine in 2022, Russia controlled over $12.5 trillion worth of Ukrainian mineral and gas capability. This included more than 56% of Ukraine’s hard coal reserves (valued at approximately $12 trillion), 20% of Ukraine’s gas fields and 11% of its oil fields, the second largest in Europe and worth approximately $85 billion. After the first year, Russia controlled between 50% and 100% of Ukraine’s reserves of lithium, tantalum, cesium, and strontium, all critical for green energy technologies and defense industries.[3]  Russia’s direct control of these resources is supported by indirect control of distribution for reserves of rare earths and other minerals such as uranium, gallium and neon.  Russia’s partnership with China and it’s 90% control of rare earth refining and manufacturing of permanent magnets would give Putin a clear reason for keeping these areas in any future agreement.  Russia’s interests are historic, military and economic.

The 28 Point Peace Plan.

The genesis of the peace proposal is murky at best.  Reuters reported last week that the U.S.-backed 28-point peace plan to end the war drew from a Russian-authored paper submitted to the Trump administration.  The Russians shared the paper, which outlined Moscow’s conditions for ending the war, with senior U.S. officials in mid-October.  The so-called “non-paper,” contained language Russia had previously put forward, including concessions Ukraine formerly rejected such as surrendering a significant amount of its territory in the east. The plan was discussed during a meeting between Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, special envoy Steve Witkoff and Kirill Dmitriev, the head of one of Russia’s sovereign wealth funds, in Miami last month.  Because the White House seemed either unwilling or uncaring about discussing the plan internally with other US leaders or externally with allies, it was met with resistance across the board.  This set off a series of discussions that have apparently modified the plan while bringing in major players like Secretary of State Rubio who characterized the plan as a Russian “wish list”.

Ukrainian officials walked a careful line and said they supported the modified framework but emphasized that sensitive issues such as territorial concessions needed to be addressed between Zelenskiy and Trump.  Even if these two leaders can agree on these points, getting Putin to agree to any modification is a major hurdle.  Any lasting peace must also include European leaders who also have a vested interest in deterring Russian aggression.  In an update to the House of Commons on 25 November, British Prime Minister Starmer said that the original 28-point plan had included points “that were not acceptable”, but that it also raised some “important elements that will be essential for a just and lasting peace”.  He said Ukraine must be able to defend itself in the future and that decisions about Ukraine’s future “must be determined by Ukraine”.[4]  As for NATO, in an interview with El País on 26 November, NATO Secretary General Rutte, also rejected the suggestion that Russia should have a veto over who can become a member of NATO, but he added that many NATO members oppose Ukraine’s accession in the short term.

Other Issues with the Plan[5]

Although there are some good aspects to the plan such as nuclear arms treaty extensions and investments in schools and infrastructure, there are several points receiving criticism. One reason the plan is flawed is the lack of coordination and consultation internally with the Department of State and NSC and externally with European allies.  The plan reflects this lack of diplomatic dexterity.  The third point states: “It is expected that Russia will not invade neighboring countries and NATO will not expand further” … a clear tripwire for Russia.  If NATO expands further, they would be justified in another invasion…and not just of Ukraine.  This is why Secretary General Rutte issued his strong statement.   Point four then states: “A dialogue will be held between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, to resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation in order to ensure global security and increase opportunities for cooperation and future economic development.” (emphasis added).  This elevates the US into a position as the de facto leader of NATO instead of a member who is part of an alliance.  Such an arrangement would allow Russia to avoid any European issues in the future and appeal directly to the US instead of dealing with NATO and the EU.

Point Nine: European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.  This presents a significant issue for NATO and the EU.  This language could be interpreted as restricting any deployments in any other nation except Poland.  This could include Romania and the Baltic states.  Such a restriction would negatively affect the defense for eastern Europe.

Later in the document, at #13 regarding Russian reintegration into the global economy, the US would agree to enter into a long-term economic cooperation agreement for mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, rare earth metal extraction projects in the Arctic, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.  How these agreements would be emplaced, and the access to sensitive US technology will likely be serious points of concern.  More specifically in the following point, the US is slated to receive 50% of the profits from reinvestments of frozen funds used to rebuild Ukraine along with a $100 billion investment from Europe.  Although the objective is to tie the parties together so that common interests in profit will overcome any desire for conflict, it is at best morally questionable to profit from rebuilding a nation that was invaded and savaged by Russia.  The language is not unlike a treaty between the US and Russia and would likely get the interest of Congress a result.

On 2 December President Zelenskiy announced the deal had been reworked by Ukraine and the US.[6]  Which parts of the original plan have been dropped or modified will be made known in the coming days and weeks, and Russia’s response will be very telling.

Conclusion: Putin the Strategist

Putin likely knew his plan was at risk from the jump.  The restrictions on NATO are red herrings for the alliance.  Putting Ukraine’s future in the hands of a US led committee, even if personally guaranteed by President Trump, and giving up land that Russia illegally and viciously obtained in violation of International Law would be a bitter pill for Ukraine, and cause Europe to harken back to the appeasement of Hitler leading up to WWII.  The addition of a profit incentive for the US clearly panders to Trump’s business sensibilities while begging the question of why would profits be taken by any party if the goal is to rebuild a war-ravaged nation?  It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Putin does not want peace, and in fact wants the conflict to continue so that he can reintegrate Ukraine into Russia once more, as he outlined in his chronicle. At worst he retains control of much of the economic power and strategic military territory and at best makes the US responsible for getting Europe to agree to future negotiations on a wide range of issues.  The counter proposal, which Putin likely anticipated, will draw out the discussions and allow him to reject any part not strictly in line with the discussions between his representatives and the US.  So, while Secretary of the Army Driscoll is meeting with a Russian delegation in Abu Dhabi, a Ukrainian delegation is also in the UAE for talks with the U.S. team while Kushner is accompanying Witkoff to Moscow for an audience with Putin.  What they can accomplish with three separate groups all discussing the same proposals at virtually the same time, even if they are tightly coordinated, is still a risk because the most difficult discussions will come when Putin weighs in on the changed plan.  Because of this, without new incentives for Russia, there will likely not be a ceasefire, let alone peace in the near future, and Putin will continue his movements into Ukraine.

[1] See:  https://www.wsj.com/opinion/Russias broken promises

[2] See:  http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

[3] See:  https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2025-issue-no-29/the-mineral-wars

[4] See:  https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10411/CBP-10411.pdf

[5] See:  https://news.sky.com/28 Point Plan

[6] See:  https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-latest-news-putin-pokrovsk-b2876419.html

Learn more about the author, Advisory Board member and retired U.S. Air Force Major General Michael Snodgrass.