Background
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is mandated by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols (Public Law 99-433) requires the President to deliver to Congress a comprehensive, annual “national security strategy report.”

The NSS is sent from the President to Congress to accomplish three goals:
• Communicate the executive branch’s vision or the “Ends” the nation should achieve to the legislative branch
• Outline the “Ways” or how the actual strategies that, in combination, shape the global environment and provide enduring security for the American people
• Finally, address the capabilities the nation has, the “Means” to accomplish those strategies to achieve the vision.
These three areas provide a broad strategic context for employing all instruments of national power. The legislation requires the report be submitted to Congress annually, on the date the President submits the budget for the following fiscal year.

National Security Strategies have consistently addressed broad and enduring goals while acknowledging the changes in the world order and priority of threats to America. Some NSS documents address the “Ends, Ways and Means” necessary while others focus more on the vision or “Ends”, and do not flesh out the “Ways” and “Means”. In any event, there are important differences in how the documents portray American power and give insight into the underlying philosophies of individual administrations.

Commonality
There is considerably commonality between the NSS for 2022 and the previous three strategies. Topics like Weapons of Mass Destruction, Cyber Security and Threats, Terrorism, building alliances, Innovation and Technology Development, protecting the U.S. industrial base and energy policy are in most of the recent NSS documents.
Common themes exist in the elements of power, and particularly on diplomatic and economic elements of power and how they can be used to help shape the world order to enhance American security. The following passage is similar in the last 4 NSS documents:
Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity

How the 2022 NSS differs from previous documents
There are interesting differences between the last two NSS documents that require detailed focus. Some are differences in the emphasis, other differences are more fundamental.

The Climate
“Climate,” sometimes amplified with terms like “change” or “crisis” appears 63 times. By contrast, in 2006 “climate” appears once. In the 2022 NSS climate is linked to everything from the Middle East situation to exploration of Space. On page 9: “Of all of the shared problems we face, climate change is the greatest and potentially existential for all nations.” Key to execution of this policy is the Policy for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), released on June 26, 2022, as a Presidential Memorandum to most of the cabinet.

Relying on previous legislative authorities, PGII states:
The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the heads of other relevant agencies shall prioritize programming consistent with the policy and approach described in sections 1 and 2 of this memorandum to support timely delivery of international infrastructure development, particularly across the PGII’s four key priorities, as appropriate and consistent with their respective authorities.

The linkage of PGII with the NSS clearly indicates that the policy of the US government is to invest in low- and middle-income countries to help them finance infrastructure improvements in climate and energy security, connectivity, health security and gender equality and equity. The underlined sections of the passage above plainly communicate the president’s desires on this subject.
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the fundamental facts on the ground in most if not all low- and middle-income countries. As the Bush administration found in the mid 2000’s with the Millennium Challenge Account program, many nations lack the basic infrastructure and financial institutions to be able to accept and execute funds for these types of programs. Without a reliable power generation capability, or access to clean water and a road system that allows movement of people and goods; short term investments in energy and climate security and the other goals outlined in PGII will likely be ineffectual.
Corporations who can affect changes in this space should make their capabilities understood by the Department of State Regional/Country Desk officers. In addition, any agency having regulatory oversight for domestic products should also be kept informed of corporations’ desire to participate in these projects. In particular, USAID and Commerce should be informed of corporations’ willingness to partner with the USG on such projects.

The recent G20 Summit in Indonesia reaffirmed international support for reducing the use of coal power as the US and China agreed to resume cooperation on climate change. Also, the coalition of nations supporting the shutdown of coal plants in Indonesia (reportedly as much as $20B in public and private financing) could offer investment opportunities for corporations seeking to install more climate friendly power production facilities in Indonesia and other nations moving away from coal-based power plants. The list of major coal users includes China, Germany, Russia, Japan and South Africa. Of note, there are no low- and middle-income nations in the top 10 coal users on the planet.

The Arctic
Another fundamental difference is the inclusion of the Arctic as a region that directly affects US vital national interests. In recent years the Arctic has gained more visibility; but the history of American interest in the region dates to Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell who said in a speech to the US Congress on 11 February 1935 that Alaska was “the most strategic place in the world” . Although the 2022 NSS says that Arctic nations have the primary responsibility for addressing regional challenges (pg.45), it fails to recognize that America is in fact an arctic nation while pointing out that Russia and China have both invested significantly in modernizing military capabilities in the region as well as increasing the pace and frequency of Arctic exercises and research activities.
The NSS does commit to improving U.S. maritime domain awareness, communications, disaster response capabilities and icebreaking capacity. This will give our Navy and Coast Guard investment programs measurable rationale for increasing investments in Arctic survivable capabilities in these areas.

Innovation
Previous NSS discussed ways of protecting U.S. innovation against intellectual property violations, restricting persons who could be non-traditional intelligence collectors and protecting data and infrastructure.
In contrast, the 2022 NSS promises to not only continue previous efforts to strengthen private sectors against disruptions by the PRC and other actors, but also to invest in areas where private industry has not “mobilized to protect our core economic and national security interests” (pg. 14). First among these investments is the CHIPS and Science Act which authorizes $280 billion for civilian investment in research and development, especially in critical sectors such as semiconductors and advanced computing, next-generation communications, clean energy technologies, and biotechnologies.

Allies and Partners
An important change in the 2022 NSS is the reliance on Allies and Partners to achieve the ends of America’s strategy. The 2006 NSS discusses Allies in 27 places throughout the document, mostly in the context of protecting allies while acknowledging their role in the Global War on Terror. In 2022 we find a more assertive approach to depending on our network of allies and partners to achieve our goals and protect our interests. In 47 places throughout the strategy, the NSS emphasizes the essential nature of allies and partners in not only helping secure our vital interests, but also supporting democracy and human rights around the globe. The clearest statement on page 21 is: “Incorporating allies and partners at every stage of defense planning is crucial to meaningful collaboration”.
This approach is directly related to the policy of removing barriers to technology sharing with allies and partners. The NSS specifically addresses not only sharing technologies but also finding ways of enhancing joint capability development and production to “safeguard our shared military-technological edge.” (pg. 21) This statement represents a fundamental shift in policy that may require additional legislation from Congress.

The President has broad powers in Title 22 regarding export of weapons and technologies. These powers translate into a very complicated bureaucratic system of coordination between the various departments of State, Commerce and Defense. Title 22 USC 2778 first established in 1950, then significantly changed in 1976 and amended yearly thereafter sets up the process and policy for control of Foreign Military Sales and control of arms exports and imports, which includes critical technologies.
Export of technologies is a dual edged sword. On one hand it brings allies and partners closer to through the same or very close capabilities as US forces. This allows for more seamless interaction, cooperation and in some cases interoperability with potential allies. However, sharing technology also reduces the combat edge our forces hold over potential adversaries because control of technologies released to allies becomes a very intricate and complex discussion. As a result, there is often friction between the departments of State, Commerce and Defense because invariably Defense wants to protect any significant military advantage while State and Commerce see technology sharing as a way to enhance relationships. Both points of view are valid. The fact that the 2022 NSS leans toward more technology sharing signifies that investments in companies which are positioned to share those technologies and weapons systems could produce higher returns than companies that do not have the ability or the market share to export their products or technologies.

Integrated Deterrence

Another major change to the NSS from the 2017 NSS is the concept of Integrated Deterrence. This concept has five major aspects:
• Integration across domains
• Integration across regions
• Integration across the spectrum of conflict
• Integration across the US Government
• Integration with allies and partners

For the first time these various parts are connected in a single place in the NSS. Many of these parts have been pursued in the past, such as integration across the U.S. government, which was previously known as far back as 2005 as the Whole of Government Approach to national security. This concept brings all capabilities under one heading, allowing the use of diplomatic, intelligence, economic and military to solve problems we face.

The concept is appealing but, in many cases, unrealistic. Most issues fall into one or another lanes for the various departments. When financial monitoring of multi-national criminal organizations is needed, the Department of the Treasury has the capabilities and the legal authorities necessary. Although they will inform and at times coordinate with the Department of State, Commerce and Defense have no active role on a day-to-day basis. The same can be said of law enforcement activities and many humanitarian aid undertakings short of a major crisis like the Tsunami of 2004. State has a role in all activities and is a major player in any situation involving our allies and partners. However, once the decision is made to use military power the actual execution is done within the Defense Department while keeping State informed on progress and any changes to objectives.
As a practical matter, how these five areas are going to be integrated into a “seamless combination of capabilities” is not explained in the document. The strategy correctly says that this concept will require us to “more effectively coordinate and innovate” (pg. 22), but there is no road map, policy or legislation proposed for this concept to achieve reality.

Conclusion
The 2022 NSS presents some new ideas and concepts that are important for the security and prosperity of America. It recognizes the threats and outlines some new ways of meeting those threats that were not outlined in previous NSS documents. However, the lack of implementation guidance and concrete actions in most of the document translates to a narrative that will likely be a reference for budget arguments when convenient but not a guide to actual policy or legislation in the near term.

About Michael Snodgrass

Michael Snodgrass retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Major General in 2011. He is currently the President of SG Strategic Solutions LLC.

He has extensive command and leadership experience in the U.S. Air Force and joint world, as well as a wide range of disciplines, including defense and aerospace, technology development, government acquisitions and requirements, foreign military sales and leadership coaching.

He consults with the government, defense industry and other businesses on a wide range of topics. In 2019 he became an adjunct contract professor supporting the U.S. Air Force on strategy and policy development.

From 2014 to 2016 he was Vice President, International Business Development at Raytheon Corp. Prior to that he was Director of U.S. Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration programs at Engility Corp.

General Snodgrass joined Burdeshaw and Associates in 2012 and is a Senior Consultant for numerous clients in the defense and aerospace sectors.

Prior to his retirement, he was U.S. Air Force Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs; responsible for formulating and executing USAF Policy, Strategy and Programs for Building Partnerships and integrating Air Force policy with international partner goals, totaling over $40 billion total program value.

From 2007 to 2010 he served as the first Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command. There, he was responsible for the construction of the country’s newest Unified Geographic Command.

He has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels and has lived in/visited over 50 nations while in uniform. He has over 3500 flight hours in various aircraft including the F-16, F-15, F-4, C-130 and HH-60, as well as over 100 combat missions in Operation Desert Storm.

In addition, General Snodgrass teaches leadership and management courses. In his spare time, he provides leadership coaching and training to the U.S. Air Force ROTC unit at Florida State University.