Executive Summary

• The carrot and stick approach by the Trump administration may work.
• Putin must find a way to reconcile his vision of victory with current events.
• Reconciliation as an annual funding approach for complex DoD programs is not a long term or repeatable solution.

Ukraine

Support for Ukraine against Russia’s invasion has been strong by both American political parties the past few years.  Russia’s potential threat to the rest of Europe boosted NATO membership.  With Trumps urging, defense spending by most of NATO has increased.  Both before and after President Trump’s inauguration he pledged to end the war in Ukraine…rapidly.  In an interview with Time Magazine he clarified, saying: “Well, I said (24 hours) figuratively, and I said that as an exaggeration, because to make a point, and you know, it gets, of course, by the fake news [unintelligible]. Obviously, people know that when I said that, it was said in jest, but it was also said that it will be ended.”[1]  Trumps efforts have been substantial, with him attempting to play an even hand between Zelensky and Putin, even to the extent of reprimanding the Ukrainian president in public.

Progress, especially with Putin, has eluded the president.  February saw a strong diplomatic push with calls from the President to Putin, White House announcements about meetings in Saudi Arabia (without Ukraine), SecState Rubio meeting Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and Zelensky’s poor performance in the White House. March was somewhat better as Zelensky was warmly welcomed by the UK a day before the President halted shipments of military aid to Ukraine. The next day, possibly with London’s urging, Zelensky issued a statement that his meeting with Trump did not go as planned and reiterated Ukraine is ready to sign a minerals deal. Next the US stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine, immediately followed by a statement by Ukrainian and US officials saying they agreed to meet “in the near future.”  By March 11^th, Ukraine had agreed in principle to a US ceasefire proposal following talks in Saudi Arabia, and the US agreed to reinstate military and intelligence sharing.  Once the Ukrainian president was back on the reservation, the administration refocused on Russia.

On March 13^th, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff traveled to Moscow to brief the Kremlin on the peace plan. Putin agreed in principle but then presented a list of demands that made the plan unworkable. One demand was a suggestion that Ukraine halt mobilization and troop training, and that other nations stop supplying weapons to Kyiv during the ceasefire.  Basically, Russia could continue to train and prepare, but Ukraine could not.  Five days later, Trump called Putin but could not convince him to sign the agreement. The White House reported Russia agreed to temporarily halt attacks on energy and infrastructure targets in Ukraine. Russia instead said it agreed to refrain from attacks on “energy infrastructure”, a very different outcome. Two days later, Russia launched a large-scale attack against the southern Ukrainian port city of Odesa.

March 23-25 saw several meetings in Riyadh between the US, Ukraine, and Russia.  US officials announced an agreement with Russia to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea. Zelensky verified at a news conference that Kyiv agreed to stop using military force in the Black Sea; but the Kremlin then said it will only agree provided financial sanctions are lifted on key Russian institutions, which again negated the deal.  In a further attempt to drive Ukraine away from the US, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told CNN on March 26th that Moscow doesn’t believe Zelensky has fully grasped the changed nature of US-Russia relations.  By the end of March, after a month of intense discussions and reversals, Trump said he was “pissed off” at Putin, telling NBC News he would impose additional tariffs on Russian oil if Putin doesn’t cooperate in ongoing negotiations to end the war.[2]

By mid-April US frustration reached a small tipping point.  On the 18^th, after weeks of attacks on Ukraine, Trump said the US will “take a pass” on brokering further Russia-Ukraine talks if Moscow or Kyiv “make it very difficult” to reach a peace deal.  His comments came just hours after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the US would abandon talks unless there were clear signs of progress within days. “We’re not going to continue with this endeavor for weeks and months on end,” Rubio said, adding that the US had “other priorities to focus on”.  This was a departure for a White House which repeatedly seemed to be spiking the ball prior to crossing the goal line for most of March.

Recently, the back and forth has accelerated.  As of this writing, Russia has rejected any ceasefire as a precondition of starting peace talks (the position of Ukraine and the European nations backing Zelensky) but rather wants to meet May 15th in Turkey to negotiate an end to the war.  Zelensky said in a post on X “We await a full and lasting ceasefire, starting from tomorrow, to provide the necessary basis for diplomacy. There is no point in prolonging the killings. And I will be waiting for Putin in Türkiye on Thursday. Personally, I hope that this time the Russians will not look for excuses.”[3]  The two sides are still not in agreement about a ceasefire, but it appears Zelensky will travel to meet Putin with or without one.  For his part, Trump jumped at the possibility of talks, even without a ceasefire.  On X he said:  At least they will be able to determine whether or not a deal is possible, and if it is not, European leaders, and the U.S., will know where everything stands, and can proceed accordingly! [4]  Trump has said he may join if he can help.

Why the Russian Delays?

Putin is delaying for several reasons.  Primarily he does not know what victory should look like.  The “special operation” launched in 2022 was intended to liberate Russians living in Ukraine from an illegitimate Ukrainian government.  Instead, the unprovoked attack galvanized Ukrainian people against Russia, fighting back with a fierce moral outrage at having been invaded for no reason.  Putin’s plan for a fast, short victory quickly slipped away in 2022 as he realized defeat was a possible outcome opened the conflict’s parameters. Before the war Putin said Ukraine was not a “real country” and that its “neo-Nazi” leaders had seized power through a coup in 2014, but he could not explain why Ukraine failed to collapse when hit by a superior Russian force. So, Putin changed his narrative: Ukraine, he alleged, was being used by NATO countries, in particular the United States and the United Kingdom, to pursue their own anti-Russian objectives. Initially presented as a limited “special military operation,” the Kremlin changed their story and portrayed it as an existential struggle. This meant that instead of simply stopping Ukraine from being so troublesome, Russia needed to demonstrate to NATO countries that it could not be broken by economic sanctions or the alliance’s weapons supplies to Ukraine (implemented after the invasion). By describing the war as defensive, the Russian government was telling its people how much was at stake and warning they could not now expect a quick victory. Instead of scaling back its objectives to acknowledge the difficulties of defeating the Ukrainians in battle, the Kremlin scaled them up to justify the extra effort. Secondly, there is a significant economic boost to certain factions in Russia despite the economic sanctions.  These elites need to be handled carefully so they do not perceive the end of the conflict in unfavorable economic terms.  Third, Putin will need time to reevaluate his previous assumptions on what an acceptable end state looks like.  For example, if Ukraine accepts some territorial losses but the agreement allows them to build up its military defense capabilities and obtain security guarantees from Western partners, the outcome will work against Russia’s oft-stated demand for a demilitarized and non-NATO Ukraine. Fourth, Russia must plan for administering and subsidizing the wrecked territory with a resentful population while having to defend along the ceasefire border.  Pundits will soon recognize that had Putin accepted the March 2022 Istanbul Communiqué, a framework for a lasting settlement, the war would be a distant memory today. The framework would have required Ukraine embrace permanent neutrality and foreclose any possible membership in NATO in return for ironclad security guarantees from Russia.  Russia could have declared victory, kept the Crimea (gained after their invasion in 2014), and avoided sanctions for the past three and a half years.  Russia needs a new plan, fully thought through, and a new story.

The story may include changes in the way Russia views the United States.  Despite the vitriol between Russia and the Biden administration, the Kremlin is looking at a new approach to the US.  In February, during a visit to the Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB, Putin noted that contacts with the new administration in Washington “inspire certain hopes,” adding that “not everyone is happy to see Russian-U.S. contacts resume” and that the security services would need to be vigilant so the new “dialogue” isn’t derailed. Continuing this line a few days later, Foreign Minister Lavrov commented that, contrary to long-standing Soviet and Russian doctrines, the United States has never been a warmonger toward Russia; Europe has always been the primary threat. “Over the past 500 years, all tragedies in the world originated in Europe or occurred owing to European policies.”[5]  The Russian people seem to be buying into this narrative.  In a Levada survey in February, 70% of respondents said the United States should be at the table with Russia, and 85% approved of bilateral meetings between Russia and the US in Saudi Arabia. As the Russian public sees it, although there will have to be agreements with Ukraine, the most important goal is to find common ground with Trump.  In the survey, most respondents (75%) would support Putin if he decided “this week” to end the conflict with Ukraine. However, if Putin decided “this week” to end the conflict, but with the condition of returning the annexed territories, his decision would be supported by only 28% of Russians.[6]

It is possible the back and forth, carrot and stick, appeasement and threats approach by the Trump administration may work.  Europe is not happy about being left out of the discussion in this very fast-moving dialogue, but Zelensky is keeping pace and making sure he is not on the wrong side of the discussion with Trump.  Rubio’s comment about walking away without progress was not an empty threat, and coming from him had the added effect of sounding like a well thought out position that has the president’s support.  Although the administration needs to be cautions that the old saying “If you want it bad you will get it bad” may be a possible outcome, keeping Putin from assuming American support regardless of their negotiating position will be key.  The president’s recent missive that Putin may not want an agreement at all is insight into the administration’s thought process in this regard.

Impact of OMB Director’s DoD Funding Proposal

Russ Vought, the Office of Management and Budget director, has suggested that the military receive spending increases only through a procedure known as budget reconciliation instead of the annual budget.  Republicans in Congress worry a one-time boost through reconciliation would be temporary and not provide for long-term security needs.  On the plus side, reconciliation bills in the Senate aren’t subject to filibuster, and the scope of amendments is limited, giving this process real advantages for enacting controversial budget measures. Without a three-fifths majority, this process can speed up the passage of funding.  Created by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, reconciliation allows for expedited consideration of certain tax, spending, and debt limit legislation, but generally prohibits consideration of any amendment that would raise spending or cut taxes without fully offsetting the cost.  Another upside is the ability to move more quickly using current-year funding instead of waiting for the normal budget cycle.  For example, this fall Congress will act on the FY 2026 budget request, which will take some months to get funding to the military.  Reconciliation could get those funds many months earlier.[7]

This means that DoD programs which either require increased funding or are new starts would be approved using reconciliation.  Congress spends considerable time examining new programs, which this approach would preclude.  The department is barred Title 10 from signing contracts unless they have a fully funded program…that is unless Congress has authorized and appropriated funds.[8]  Since Reconciliation is a one year at a time approach, and DoD programs are usually multi-year endeavors, the department would have to sign a series of one-year contracts with suppliers, substantially increasing program cost as well as the risk for both the department and the contractor.  Although the Budget Act allows for future years reconciliation bills, this approach would be an additional burden on Congress as well as skirting normal committee processes.  Disallowing multi-year contracts and efficient planning puts delivery of capabilities at risk.  It is unnecessary.

In 2025 reconciliation could be used to jump start some programs like the Golden Dome system, but with the understanding that DoD will fully fund the program in the 2026 budget request.  Other than that implementation, it is not a wise choice for funding national security requirements.

Conclusions

The carrot and stick, appeasement and threats approach by the Trump administration may work in stopping the war, but not unless Putin finds a way to reconcile his vision of victory with current events.  The administration needs to be cautious and not declare victory too soon as talks move forward.  As long as Putin keeps changing the terms of any agreement, the conflict will continue.

Using reconciliation for an annual funding approach for complex DoD programs is not a long term or repeatable solution.  It may be useful to jump start programs and avoid a filibuster, but there is no crisis requiring the administration to circumvent the normal process of debate and congressional oversight.

[1] See:  https://time.com/7280114/donald-trump-2025-interview-transcript/

[2] See:  https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/26/europe/timeline-trumps-pledge-to-end-ukraine-war

[3] See:  https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1921611690891940116

[4] See:  https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114490093180275292

[5] See:  https://link.foreignaffairs.com/view/6734e34cd77841c3b00eb34bnoy8b.5q58/fac07759

[6] See:  https://www.levada.ru/en/2025/03/10/the-conflict-with-ukraine-attention-support-attitude-to-negotiations-and-possible-concessions-opinion-on-the-various-terms-of-a-peace-agreement-in-february-2025/

[7] See:  https://www.cbpp.org/research/introduction-to-budget-reconciliation

[8] See:  https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2010-title10/USCODE-2010-title10-subtitleA-partIV-chap139-sec2366b/context

 

Learn more about the author, Advisory Board member and retired U.S. Air Force Major General Michael Snodgrass.