Executive Summary

• Defense Secretary Hegseth has said the war is “paused” due to the ceasefire,
  avoiding any Congressional notification and action.
• Unless they feel threatened, Iranian leaders will continue to play for time and
  hope the US finally walks away.
• The US is in a diplomatic and strategic corner. President Trump’s changing
  goals added confusion as did alternating between declaring victory and making
  callous threats.
• Iran is running out of time but has shown particularly strong resistance to any
  threat.

Current Situation

The US has managed to put itself into a corner with Iran and did so with little assistance
from Tehran. Iran’s approach has been to keep world opinion focused on the stalemate
while gaining time to refit their shattered military.

On Monday, May 4, Defense Secretary Hegseth talked about a new U.S. mission to
protect commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz that would be temporary. The US
appears to be attempting to gain support from other nations who would at some point take
over the escort duties. Hegseth said the ceasefire with Iran is in place despite attacks on
U.S. ships.

As far back as March 11, the US military has been working on a way to protect ships in
the strait and reduce if not eliminate Iranian capabilities to threaten shipping. So far, over
1500 ships are sitting at various points in the gulf, waiting for relief to move their cargo.

The US is in a diplomatic and strategic corner of their own making. First, they ignored
allies prior to starting hostilities and did seek international backing which they
subsequently almost begged for in public statements. Next, there was no clear case for
the war given to the American people, Congress or allies. Those arguments could have
been made in the time between the June attacks on Iran’s nuclear capabilities or in the
early moments of conflict. Changing goals added confusion as did alternating between
declaring victory and making callous threats. Now the President is avoiding
Congressional action and enforcement of the War Powers Resolution to stop hostilities.

US goals seemed to change often, and without any preamble. The first objective laid out
by President Trump was on a video posted on Truth Social: “Our objective is to defend
the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime…that this
terrorist regime can never have a nuclear weapon.” En route to that goal, were the
objectives of destroying the Iranian Navy, Air Force and capability to launch missiles and
drones. A side show was to eliminate Iran’s support to their proxies in the region, thus
providing security for US allies in the Gulf. However, regime change was mentioned as a
goal early in the conflict, but that theme seemed to wane over the weeks as no popular
uprising was observed. Then when Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, the administration
declared at first that opening the strait was a goal, only to be reversed 10 days later as
unimportant to the US. Now, it appears to again be a goal of President Trump, as the US
Navy is finding ways of getting shipping through the narrow passage. The President’s
critics make a lot of these variations, when actually, this is a problem of staying on
message, and clearly outlining the strategic goal and tactical objectives necessary to
achieve that goal.

The period of April 1 to April 7 saw whipsaws of statements from a prediction of the end
in “three days” to attacks continuing for two to three weeks (both on 1 April), to threats of
taking out the entire country in one night and the next day the suspension of bombing for
two weeks. During this period Iran tried to sway gulf states by sending waves of missiles
toward their civilian infrastructure as well as into Israel. That largely failed until Trump
and his advisors realized the clock was ticking on their strategy. On April 8, a ceasefire
was announced for 14 days to allow Pakistan to mediate peace talks between the two
sides.

The ceasefire is shaky mostly due to Iran’s new strategy. Iran is clever. They know the
US electorate has a small appetite for conflict; Trump is suffering from declining
popularity, the global economy is a bit staggered by the closure of the strait, Trump has
the War Powers Resolution and some in Congress pushing for a termination, and that
their proxies can keep poking the Israeli’s, provoking a response they can use to declare
the US and Israel have violated the ceasefire. Iran’s goal is to wait out the US while
rebuilding their inventory of missiles and repairing as much of the damage as possible to
their infrastructure. Delivering 10-point plans, 14-point responses back and forth and the
stop and start of possible further negotiations plays nicely into the Iranian strategy. They
can shoot at some ships with small arms, maybe fly a drone toward an escorted ship, and
still the US claims the ceasefire is holding while Iran tries to intimidate commercial
shipping companies from challenging the closure.

An indication was Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi’s declaration on May 4, that
events proved there can be no military solution to the conflict. After attacking sites in the
UAE, he said peace talks were progressing and warned the U.S. and the UAE against
being drawn into a “quagmire.” The UAE said Iranian attacks marked a serious escalation
and it reserved the right to respond while Secretary Hegseth said the ceasefire was
holding. Also, part of the strategy is Iran’s proxy Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel. Since the
start of the conflict until 16 April, Hezbollah attacked Israel from Lebanon over 1,400
times. Since April 18, attacks and responses have significantly lessened but the effect on
the ceasefire was clear. By claiming the US and Israel have violated the ceasefire, Iran is
trying to apply pressure to the US, letting the clock continue to run on the War Powers
discussion.

Keeping the Strait of Hormuz open has temporarily supplanted elimination of Iran’s
nuclear program as the primary goal. President Trump has stated on many occasions his
desire for the strait to be free for ships to pass, a reaction to the effect the closure has
had not only in the US but also in Europe and, in particular, Africa (fertilizer constitutes a
large percentage of imports to nations on the Horn of Africa from Iran). The US has
opened a small lane south of Iran that is free of mines, gives the US Navy some standoff,
and therefore, reaction time from missile and drone attacks. It also allows for response
time for Navy and Air Force assets to interdict any small boats that venture out against
the escort operation. Admiral Cooper, Commander of U.S. Central Command, said they
had successfully removed or destroyed all Iranian mines along that lane. He said Iran has
launched multiple cruise missiles, drones and small boats at civilian ships under the U.S.
military’s protection. Six of the small boats were destroyed.

On May 5, Iran’s parliamentary speaker and chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf,
posted on X and accused Washington of undermining shipping security in the Strait of
Hormuz. Qalibaf warned that a “new equation” in the strait is taking shape

He suggested Tehran has yet to fully respond to the US attempt to reopen the
waterway: “We know full well that the continuation of the status quo is intolerable for
America; while we have not even begun yet.” The Iranian plan: Avoid direct
confrontation that would renew air attacks on Iran’s fragile infrastructure, delay any
negotiations by countering peace proposals with unacceptable terms, pressure the US
with small attacks that intimidate shipping and let the clock run out on an administration
that clearly wants the conflict to be over but cannot back down.

Possible Future Actions

To get around the War Powers Resolution, the US Defense Secretary has said the
ceasefire creates a “pause” in the 60-day clock mandated by the law (which was
passed by Congress over the attempted veto by then-President Nixon). The law actually
says: “Sec 4 (c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or
into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long
as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to
the Congress…” [1] The administration is attempting to say there are no hostilities
happening therefore no report is necessary. No legal scholar has backed this approach.
Next was to create a new effort, labeled “Project Freedom” to open the strait, calling it a
humanitarian effort to assist stranded sailors on hundreds of ships that have been stuck
in the Gulf since the war began. This attempt to avoid asking Congress for an additional
30 days of funding (in accordance with the law) neglects to address the fact that the
U.S. has been enforcing a naval blockade on Iranian ports since April 13, turning back
some 49 commercial ships as part of Epic Fury. The blockade is intended to deprive
Tehran of much needed oil revenue as well as come to the peace table and make
concessions on its nuclear program. The administration has conveniently forgotten that
a Naval Blockade is, by definition, an act of war[2] and continuing the blockade means
that “Epic Fury” is still underway and the 60-day limit has not paused, it has passed. It
seems clear the President has no intention of asking Congress for any permissions or
funding.

Option 1: Extended stalemate. Iran would be perfectly happy for an extended
stalemate that does not include attacks on infrastructure or military capabilities. That
time will be used to find alternative routes for oil exports to their supporters (China and
Russia) as well as build back some of their missile and drone capabilities. Eventually
they believe the US Congress will exert some influence and stop funding for the war. It
is important to note that funding is necessary for the deployment of forces as well as
combat operations. Actual combat costs money to be sure, but it is the day-to-day costs
that continue to add up as the ceasefire continues. At some point, the US Government
Accountability Office, or another agency, will peel back the administration’s (likely very
low) estimate of $25B for the operation and find many more dollars are being spent on
this effort. This option is the best case for Iran and a bad choice for the US.

Option 2: The US cedes control of the Strait of Hormuz to Iran. Control of the Strait has
replaced Iran’s nuclear program as the central issue. Prior to February 28, it was open
to navigation, without restriction or the payment of tolls. Iran has demonstrated what
military planners have feared for years, that closing it provides Iran with not only an
offensive weapon, but (possibly) a revenue stream and an insurance policy. Last week,
Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi said that there will be no return to the old status quo.

Option 2 (cont): If the US lets Iran claim the Strait of Hormuz is theirs to manage as they
see fit, Tehran can use it to charge shippers millions in tolls as well as renew their oil
exports. This is the worst case for the US; despite declaring a tactical victory over Iran’s
armed forces it would become a strategic defeat, preserve Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and
embarrass the administration.

Option 3: The peace talks fall apart, or Iran launches attacks that cannot be deemed
“Below the threshold of hostilities,” and the US resumes attacking, to force Iran to meet
Trump’s terms. As the escort operation has more effect Iran may eventually see that them
leverage is short term and their negotiating position begins to weaken. Iranian attacks
against the UAE are an indicator that the regime is trying to force a strong response in the
hope that the renewed US attacks will cause Congress to withhold funding IAW the War
Powers Resolution. This is somewhat likely, but it will depend on who in Iran is actually
making decisions and what their long-term goals are for their nuclear program. Leaders in
Iran continues to say things in public that seem counter to the direction the US claims talks
are headed. Mohsen Rezaee, a former commander of the Revolutionary Guard and a
member of Iran’s Expediency Council, wrote on X that “the president of the United States,
the secretary of war, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff share one trait: they sell
their delusions as achievements.” In a second post, he said: “Iran’s powerful armed forces
stand ready. What awaits U.S. forces won’t be Normandy or Sicily; it will look more like
Tabas. Don’t indulge in illusions.” [3] The main problem here is that such an attack could
cost the lives of many Americans and of our allies in the region. The backlash against the
US and Israeli governments would be possibly severe and cause the US Congress to
finally assert its position with the President.

Option 4: Iran indicates they will come back to the table and conduct serious
negotiations. That may have already happened as Trump recently announced that the
escort operation through the Strait of Hormuz will be paused for a short period, citing a
request from Pakistan and progress towards a final agreement with Iran. However, the
naval blockade of Iranian ports will remain in place. Since Israel and Hezbollah continue to
attack each other, this could be used by Iran once again to halt any peace talks, but the
threat of Congressional intervention appears to be less likely as each day beyond the
initial 60-day limit passes. Iran’s actions against the UAE have had the unintended effect
of pushing the UAE closer to the US and Israel. On Tuesday, Israeli Prime Minister
Netanyahu called UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan to condemn the
attacks on civilians and civilian facilities in the emirate in a sign of solidarity. Iran’s ability
to have it both ways may soon deteriorate.

Conclusion
President Trump is frustrated. His initial belief, despite warnings to the contrary, that the
war would be over quickly and decisively has proven wrong. His apparent view that Iran
would fold under pressure has given way to his hope for a peace deal (ever the deal
maker), avoiding a clash with Congress. He must also be frustrated by Iran’s
determination to resist whatever America and Israel can inflict on the country. A regime
prepared to shoot its own citizens in the streets for protesting, (the last time was in
January), is unlikely to worry a great deal about their welfare. Their only concern is their
ability to hold onto power. Unless they feel threatened, which will not happen with a
blockade or an escort operation of 20+ ships a day, Iranian leaders will continue to play
for time and hope the US finally walks away.

About Michael Snodgrass

Michael Snodgrass retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Major General in 2011. He is
currently the President of SG Strategic Solutions LLC.

He has extensive command and leadership experience in the U.S. Air Force and joint
world, as well as a wide range of disciplines, including defense and aerospace,
technology development, government acquisitions and requirements, foreign military
sales and leadership coaching.

He consults with the government, defense industry and other businesses on a wide range
of topics. In 2019 he became an adjunct contract professor supporting the U.S. Air Force
on strategy and policy development.

From 2014 to 2016 he was Vice President, International Business Development at
Raytheon Corp. Prior to that he was Director of U.S. Air Force and Federal Aviation
Administration programs at Engility Corp.

General Snodgrass joined Burdeshaw and Associates in 2012 and is a Senior Consultant
for numerous clients in the defense and aerospace sectors.
Prior to his retirement, he was U.S. Air Force Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for
International Affairs; responsible for formulating and executing USAF Policy, Strategy and
Programs for Building Partnerships and integrating Air Force policy with international
partner goals, totaling over $40 billion total program value.

From 2007 to 2010 he served as the first Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command. There, he
was responsible for the construction of the country’s newest Unified Geographic
Command.

He has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels and has lived in/visited over
50 nations while in uniform. He has over 3500 flight hours in various aircraft including the
F-16, F-15, F-4, C-130 and HH-60, as well as over 100 combat missions in Operation
Desert Storm.

In addition, General Snodgrass teaches leadership and management courses. In his
spare time, he provides leadership coaching and training to the U.S. Air Force ROTC unit
at Florida State University.