History

NATO was created as part of a broad effort with three purposes: deterring Soviet expansionism; quelling any revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent; and encouraging European political integration.

After the Fall of the Wall, the Yugoslav conflict as well as other clashes in the region made it clear that a post-Cold War power vacuum created instability. NATO needed a way to allow non-NATO countries to cooperate with the Alliance to reform their democratic and military institutions and lessen their strategic isolation. So, NATO created the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994. Partnership for Peace allowed non-NATO countries, or “Partners”, to share information with NATO Allies and begin the process to modernize their militaries in line with contemporary democratic standards. Partners may choose their own level of involvement with the Alliance. The path to full membership would remain open to those who elected that option.

Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, following their completion of a political and military reform program, took their seats as full NATO Alliance members at the 1999 Washington Summit.  NATO enlargement continued with Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania in 2004, Croatia and Albania in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and North Macedonia in 2020.¹

Recent Events in the Region

Since 2008 Putin’s Russia has condemned this process.  Russia’s revised National Security Strategy, approved 31 December 2015, depicts NATO moves as a “strategy of containment executed by the United States and its allies”. Russia believes the threat from NATO is pervasive: “The buildup of the military potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the endowment of it with global functions pursued in violation of the norms of international law, the galvanization of the bloc countries’ military activity, the further expansion of the alliance, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders are creating a threat to (Russian) national security.” ²

While condemning NATO, Russia has also looked westward.  In 2007, the Kremlin launched cyberattacks on Estonia. On Good Friday, 2013, Russia rehearsed strikes on Sweden; known in Sweden as “the Russian Easter.”  Three months earlier, the chief of the Swedish armed forces, Sverker Göranson, had stated that Sweden had the means to defend part of the country … for a week. No other capabilities existed.  These Russian rehearsals were later revealed to be nuclear strike exercises. Sweden had no military response, no pilots scrambling up to meet the Russian planes. Instead, NATO fighter jets, from the Baltic Air Patrol, were called to meet this rehearsal.  Then in 2014, Putin annexed Crimea.  Sweden increased its defense spending, putting a stop to years of decline. In the summer of 2016, Sweden entered a joint defense pact with the United States.  Sweden and neighbor Finland have now both decided to petition for membership in NATO and Denmark has decided to reverse course and end its policy of opting out of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy.

More recently, several states have come online in support of NATO membership for Ukraine (along with Georgia and Moldova).   The nine NATO countries who support Ukraine’s membership are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. All these countries are in Eastern Europe (see map above) and could face similar aggression next unless Russia is stopped in Ukraine.

Implications

These nine nations, with Ukraine and Georgia but minus the former East Germany, constitute the bulk of the former USSR.  They know the methods, strategies, and abilities Russia has developed, and is willing to use, to gain and maintain power and influence.  They know the lengths to which Putin may be inclined to go to achieve his aims.

However, accepting Ukraine into NATO is not simple and at this stage may not be a wise choice for NATO.  As a Partnership for Peace nation, Ukraine can opt into various levels of cooperation with NATO, but PfP does not include a defense provision, as does NATO membership. In fact, if Ukraine is accepted into NATO, it would immediately trigger an Article 5 invocation and bring all of NATO into the conflict with Russia.

Consequently, as a practical matter, inclusion of Ukraine into NATO would be a de facto declaration of war against Russia for violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity. There is no united view of this option among NATO nations, and membership approval requires a unanimous decision by all. The steps for inclusion comprise three areas of improvement by the Ukrainian government: better adherence to the rule of law; a more modern defense capability that can contribute to NATO’s defense; and a path to expand economic growth to support continued defense modernization.  For these reasons, nations like Germany and France oppose Ukraine’s membership in the alliance, making any fast-track proposal dead on arrival.

Potential Next Steps

“We are where we are” sums up options for Ukraine from the NATO perspective.  In retrospect, had Ukraine made rapid progress after 2008 and been admitted into the alliance, Russia may not have invaded.  But today, most NATO members do not want the conflict to expand. However, one alternative is that the nine nations seeking Ukraine’s entry into NATO might enter supportive alliances with Ukraine either bi-laterally or regionally.  If these nations seek to enter political alliances, with no teeth in terms of supportive military commitments, it might be seen more as theater than substance, only reflecting their current monetary support.  In fact, as a percentage of GDP, many of the nine are already supporting Ukraine.  Led by Estonia the top doners in order are Latvia, Poland, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Lithuania, Canada, the UK, Sweden, and the US.  (In gross amounts the US leads all nations by a significant margin.)  However military arrangements to support Ukraine are another matter entirely.

If some, or all, of the nine nations begin discussions on political/military alliances with Ukraine it would immediately garner the attention of the United States, the UK, France, and Germany.  It is likely that political pressure as well as promises for military aid would be used to keep such discussions from maturing and becoming public knowledge.  Restating to the current NATO nine that they are protected by Article 5 should be combined with reminders that Russia’s invasion was in part a response to statements made by the West in favor of Ukraine’s membership in NATO, and a preemptive way to dictate events on their borders.

Such discussions could also provide leverage which may work in favor of ending the conflict.  Russia is not performing well on the battlefield, and Putin now may be in search of a way out.  If the West can approach Putin with a commitment to keep the nine newly minted NATO members in line with other NATO nations, in exchange for Russia leaving the occupied territories and ending the conflict, Putin may opt for a deal before the spring thaw next year.

The alternative is that the war expands, threatens Ukraine’s neighbors, and some NATO nations send troops for direct battle with Russian forces.  Given the success Ukraine’s military militia has achieved, with little training but measurable material support, it is clear that battle-weary Russian forces could suffer major defeats if NATO troops join in the conflict.  Of course, that step might lead to further escalation by Russia, including nuclear weapons use, although some may believe that eventuality is unlikely.  What must be continually considered is that Russia should not be humiliated by either Ukraine or NATO.  Russian memory is long, if sometimes imprecise, and long-term deterrence can only be achieved by mutual agreement among the parties.

¹ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm

² Presidential decree on National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, Kremlin.ru, 31 December 2015, http://kremlin.ru.  Translated by Dr Pavel K. Baev, Research Director and Professor at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

About Michael Snodgrass

Michael Snodgrass retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Major General in 2011. He is currently the President of SG Strategic Solutions LLC.

He has extensive command and leadership experience in the U.S. Air Force and joint world, as well as a wide range of disciplines, including defense and aerospace, technology development, government acquisitions and requirements, foreign military sales and leadership coaching.

He consults with the government, defense industry and other businesses on a wide range of topics. In 2019 he became an adjunct contract professor supporting the U.S. Air Force on strategy and policy development.

From 2014 to 2016 he was Vice President, International Business Development at Raytheon Corp. Prior to that he was Director of U.S. Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration programs at Engility Corp.

General Snodgrass joined Burdeshaw and Associates in 2012 and is a Senior Consultant for numerous clients in the defense and aerospace sectors.

Prior to his retirement, he was U.S. Air Force Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs; responsible for formulating and executing USAF Policy, Strategy and Programs for Building Partnerships and integrating Air Force policy with international partner goals, totaling over $40 billion total program value.

From 2007 to 2010 he served as the first Chief of Staff, U.S. Africa Command. There, he was responsible for the construction of the country’s newest Unified Geographic Command.

He has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels and has lived in/visited over 50 nations while in uniform. He has over 3500 flight hours in various aircraft including the F-16, F-15, F-4, C-130 and HH-60, as well as over 100 combat missions in Operation Desert Storm.

In addition, General Snodgrass teaches leadership and management courses. In his spare time, he provides leadership coaching and training to the U.S. Air Force ROTC unit at Florida State University.